CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES:
Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat:
Guidelines for Consideration

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The United States has not had an extensive history of dealing with suicide bomb attacks. As a result, few police and sheriffs’ departments have felt the need to develop policies and training programs specifically addressing the issues raised by such incidents.

However, the 9/11 attacks drastically changed how the United States views its own vulnerability to terrorism in general. The implications of September 11 regarding the threat of suicide bombers are still being felt around the world. After all, the 9/11 hijackers were the ultimate suicide bombers. They used commercial aircraft as bombs rather than devices that fit inside a backpack. But at their core, their motivations were the same—they believed that political or religious ideology justified murdering innocent bystanders and killing themselves in the process.

There have already been several incidents in this country over the last few years involving persons wearing or carrying explosives who killed themselves or were killed by police. Knowledgeable people agree that potential suicide bomb attacks in the United States are unfortunately part of what Sir Ian Blair refers to as the “New Normality.” For example, a 2006 survey of more than 100 foreign-policy experts—Republicans and Democrats alike—found that 91 percent said it is “likely or certain” that within the next decade the United States will suffer an attack similar in scale to the July 2005 London bombings. And when the experts were asked which two types of attacks are most likely, the most common response was “suicide bombing attacks,” followed closely by “attack on major infrastructure.” Other types of attacks, such as use of radiological or biological weapons, were ranked far lower.

In 2006, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) began a dialogue with the policing community to better understand what needs to be done to prepare for the threat of suicide bombers. In March of that year, PERF held a conference in Washington, D.C. on suicide bombing preparedness. Fifty participants from federal, state, local, and international policing agencies identified policy issues that should be considered. PERF followed up on that conference, and spent the remainder of 2006 conducting research, making site visits to police agencies in New York City, Los Angeles, London, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere, and writing a set of proposed guidelines for consideration by policing agencies. In January 2007, PERF held a second conference in Baltimore, during which we asked participants to vet the guidelines.

This report is the result of those meetings and research. It presents 68 guidelines for departments to consider—along with related documents such as a Glossary of Terms, to prevent confusion by ensuring that the terminology is used consistently. Some of the guidelines offer broad recommendations about law enforcement agencies’ entire approach to incidents that may involve a suicide bomber—for example, setting criteria for assessing the threats posed by the attacker and the risks of various police responses. Other guidelines offer very detailed advice based on what we learned from policing agencies around the world—for example, how far away from an attacker police should remain if they are using various types of radios that could inadvertently trigger a suicide bomber’s explosives.

Fundamentally, the purpose of the guidelines is to answer this question: What should first responders do—and what should they not do—when encountering a potential suicide bomber?
The guidelines recommend that law enforcement agencies create a stand alone policy and/or training curriculum on suicide bomb threats. PERF recognizes that this is controversial. At our first meeting in March 2006, it became evident that there was some reluctance to put suicide bomber policies into writing. Perhaps some chiefs think of the adage, “If the only tool you have is a hammer, you will see every problem as a nail.” In other words, if officers are trained to think carefully about suicide bombing scenarios, will it increase the chance that they will misinterpret situations, seeing a suicide-bomber terrorist every time an incident involves someone wearing a backpack? This is particularly important because we also recognize that a patrol officer is usually the first to arrive at a scene that may involve a suicide bomber.

But in the end, there was a strong consensus that policing agencies need stand alone guidelines because suicide bombing incidents are a unique type of threat that involves many considerations not present in other types of incidents.

At the same time, it should be noted that the Suicide Bomb Threat Guideline Number 1 states that suicide bomb protocols generally should be “consistent with an agency’s use-of-force policies, procedures, and training.” In other words, suicide bomb policies should expand upon policing agencies’ existing policies on use of force in general.

Motorola, Inc. and PERF are pleased to present the Guidelines for Consideration, Graduated Force Option Protocol, and Glossary of Terms which culminated from our year-long efforts to research the international policing response to suicide bomb threats. It is our hope that this publication will help more local law enforcement executives openly discuss this issue with other community leaders, examine current policies and practices, and create or modify planning and training strategies to address the threat of suicide bombers.

Chuck Wexler
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Acknowledgments

This publication represents a culmination of PERF’s year-long effort to work with the international policing community on a highly sensitive topic. We received many valuable contributions from policing agencies, and had the pleasure to learn about the committed efforts and interest of so many more.

We would like to thank the Metropolitan Police Service of London for approaching PERF with its concerns regarding the preparation, planning, and training for suicide bomb attacks. Assistant Commissioner Stephen House, at the direction of Sir Ian Blair, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, led PERF to investigate the matter, which resulted in the joint research efforts of this project, a conference to lay out the issues, and a summit to finalize much needed guidelines for consideration.

Special thanks are due to our partners at Motorola, Inc., for their support of the Critical Issues in Policing Series. Motorola has supported PERF for many years in our effort to stimulate progress in policing. We are especially grateful to Greg Brown, President and Chief Operating Officer; Mark Moon, Corporate Vice President and General Manager, Government and Commercial Markets; and Rick Neal, Vice President, Government Strategy and Business Development.

Our project would have been incomplete without the openness and hospitality we received on our many site visits with departments here and abroad. We wish to thank the following people and agencies for sharing their insights on this complex issue: Assistant Director Michael Bouchard and Division Chief Joseph Riehl, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Agent Charles Wood and Detective Jack Dineen, U.S. Capitol Police; Chief Charles Payne and his staff from the Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Bombing Prevention; Major General Mickey Levy and Brigadier General Simon Perry, Israel Police Force; Chief William Bratton, Deputy Chief Mark Leap, Commander Michael Downing, Lieutenant James West, Sergeant Sean Malinowski, and Detective Supervisor Ralph Morten, Los Angeles Police Department; Commissioner Raymond Kelly, Deputy Commissioner Michael Farrell, Inspector Michael Healey, Captain Hugh O’Rourke, Lieutenant Mark Torre, Sergeant Bacharik, and members of the Emergency Services Unit, New York City Police Department; Former Chief Charles Ramsey and Chief Cathy Lanier, Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department; Deputy Chief Constable Ian Arundale, Association of Chief Police Officers, West Mercia Police Department, UK; Commanders Simon Foy and Jo Kay, Staff Officer Helen Cryer, Former Superintendent Stephen Swain, and Police Constable Spike Townsend, London Metropolitan Police Service; Dr. Jonathan Crego, Hendon Training Center, UK; Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle Police Department; and Chief Liz Woollen, University of Oklahoma Police Department.

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and CEO Michael Heidingsfield, Memphis Shelby Crime Commission; Detective Supervisor Ralph Morten, Los Angeles Police Department Bomb Squad; and Captain Jeffrey Herold, Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department for their presentations during the Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response Conference in March 2006 and the Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit in January 2007.

Critically important to the completion of this report was the willingness of an exceptional group of individuals to participate in these two events. These extremely busy professionals graciously gave their time and expertise to determine the key issues related to suicide bomb preparedness at the first conference and to produce and revise the Guidelines for Consideration during the summit. (A complete list of participants can be found in Appendices 1 and 3.)

This report could not have been produced without the strong efforts of talented and dedicated PERF staffers. Executive Director Chuck Wexler guided the project from start to finish with insight, thoughtfulness, and determination to provide a meaningful product for the field. Corina Solé Brito and Andrea Luna coordinated the first conference and set the pace for the work to follow. Emily Milstein-Greengart was instrumental in planning a successful summit and conducting site visits pertinent to the project. PERF Fellow Rick Weger, San Jose Police Department, assisted staff on site visits. Eric Albertsen delivered essential support at the summit. Bill Tegeler, acting director of the CFA, contributed to the writing and editing of this publication. Jerry Murphy and Craig Fischer both provided helpful editorial reviews of this document. Jim Cronin and Jason Cheney provided additional support throughout the project to ensure its success. We thank each of them for their valuable contributions. Finally, this document reflects the many talents of Dave Williams, who provided layout and cover design.

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The United States is fortunate in comparison to countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel with respect to suicide bomb threats. These countries are constantly on heightened alert to the threat of suicide bombers. Security is at the forefront of everyone’s mind, not just those of the police forces.

And while the events of September 11, 2001 opened our eyes to the threats to our homeland, particularly when a committed group of people wishes to cause unimaginable harm to our country, as time goes on the threat of a new suicide bomb incident fades in many Americans’ minds. The tragic bombings of underground trains and a bus in London in 2005 were a terrible reminder that the United Kingdom, the United States, and other nations are at risk of continued attacks from individuals and organizations that are willing to kill innocent people for a particular cause or out of disagreement with government actions.

RISKS TO THE UNITED STATES

Many experts agree that a suicide bomb attack is inevitable on U.S. soil. A 2006 survey of more than 100 of America’s top foreign-policy experts found that 80 percent expect an attack similar in scale to 9/11 within a decade. Ninety-one percent of the participants believe that an attack similar to that of the 2005 London bombings is likely by 2016; 57 percent of them said they considered such an attack likely within a year. Two-thirds of the participants predicted that the next attack will be in the form of a suicide bombing. The increase in suicide bombing incidents internationally, coupled with the unrest over current foreign policy, should be reason enough for police and sheriffs’ departments to put plans in place to combat such threats before they occur.

In fact, there have been a number of such threats and attacks that have already occurred in the United States. These include:

- In September 1995, a man killed himself and his family in a car packed with explosives in Baltimore County, Md. The man lured his estranged family into the car by promising to take them school-shopping. The police ascertained that he fully intended to kill them in this manner.

- In December 2001, Richard Reid (the “Shoe Bomber”) attempted to ignite an explosive in his shoe while on board an airplane from Paris to Miami. He was subdued by passengers and the flight crew. He pled guilty to the crime and acknowledged his associations with al-Qaeda.

- In August 2003, a man, likely a victim himself, was killed by an explosive locked around his neck in Erie, Pa., after he was forced to rob a bank. The explosive detonated while he was surrounded by...
police, who were waiting for the bomb squad. This case remains unsolved, and no one has been charged with any crime related to it.

- In June 2005, a 52-year-old male walked into a federal courthouse in Seattle with a backpack strapped to his chest and a grenade in his hand. He had a history of legal battles over child-support payments. The man was shot twice and killed by police officers. The grenade was found to be inactive, and the man was carrying a living will.

- In October 2005, a student with explosives in a backpack blew himself up outside a packed university football stadium in Oklahoma. It is unknown whether he intended to kill others or not. A review of his background uncovered years of bomb-making and an interest in explosives. A search of his property yielded high quantities of explosive materials and a significant amount of jihadist literature.

- In December 2005, Air Marshals at Miami International Airport shot and killed a man who ran from an airplane and onto the jetway, claiming he had a bomb. The man’s wife said he was suffering from mental illness and had failed to take his medication. The Air Marshals defended the decision to shoot and noted the adherence to protocol for use of lethal force.

Subject matter experts often disagree about the language and definitions related to suicide bombing, using terms such as “suicide terrorism,” “homicide bomber,” and “body bomber.” Depending upon an agency’s definitions and terminology, some of the examples above may not fit into a suicide bomber classification. This document is not meant to delineate between a lone-wolf type of bomber and one with a highly organized plot with multiple bombers; it is intended to provide tools for law enforcement agencies to begin considering how patrol-level officers should respond to a suicide bomber threat. Although each incident will be unique, they all require situation and threat assessments by the officer who responds to the call. Most law enforcement experts agree that a patrol officer is the most likely person to identify and potentially confront a suicide bomber. Although many agencies have highly skilled specialized units to deal with bombs and active shooters, patrol officers will require training to handle such situations if they arise.

Some U.S. police departments, including those in Los Angeles and New York City, have identified the risk of future suicide bombers as imminent. They have written policies and conducted department-wide training, and are consistently assessing and improving their readiness. On the other hand, some departments have not yet begun to specifically address this issue. Some don’t see the threat as imminent or they feel that their jurisdiction would not be a likely target. Others feel that due to the complexities, and specifically the uncertainties, of a suicide bomb attack, little can be done until an event actually occurs. A lack of resources or expertise remains an obstacle for readiness in some departments. Many police departments in the United States have recently experienced increases in violent crime, and therefore are devoting more resources to that area rather than to crisis preparedness. Although there are many reasons why police departments are not actively preparing for a suicide

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bomb threat, we believe that police agencies would be well served by devoting time to assessing their own capacity to deal with these kinds of situations. Our country should not put off planning for a suicide bomb threat until another bombing of catastrophic proportions occurs.

PERF set out to conduct research and develop guidelines to assist departments in this area. For details about PERF’s process in developing these guidelines, see “The Development of the PERF Guidelines,” page 9. By absorbing the lessons learned by our national and international policing partners, the work of bomb squads and specialists, and the progressive actions of a number of departments, PERF hopes to provide information to initiate the development of training and policy as well as to foster further discussion on this complex and sensitive topic.
As the paradigm shift in modern policing continues to evolve, we must challenge ourselves to open our minds to what may have been unthinkable in the past. The reality is that as we improve our methods of target hardening in response to the threat posed by terrorists in our cities and towns, we may at some point encounter individuals bent on destruction and willing to sacrifice their own lives in the process.

While we must continue to fight crime, we now have a clear mandate to continue to expand our mission into the homeland security arena. It is incumbent upon us as police leaders to anticipate the myriad of possible threats posed by extremist groups. We must actively pursue best practices when it comes to scenario-based training, tactical planning and preparation.

There are still those who will say that we are erring on the side of caution as we explore all possible scenarios, including the homicide bomber striking in the heart of U.S. cities. They say, “That topic is too complex or sensitive to address,” or that the threat posed is an unlikely one in our context. They are wrong. We would be doing ourselves and our jurisdictions a disservice by not confronting this threat head-on and planning for all eventualities.

To that end, the Los Angeles Police Department has, for a number of years, been painstakingly researching, analyzing, and planning for the eventuality that, at some point, an individual will attempt to detonate an explosive device in an urban area, inflicting mass casualties and killing himself or herself in the process.

The Los Angeles Police Department is fortunate enough to have developed a cadre of personnel with specialized knowledge in this area. Our officers and detectives have worked closely with the police in various countries who have encountered these threats in the past. We have developed detailed policies and tactics to respond to a rapidly unfolding event involving a homicide bomber. Recognizing the need for an in-depth analysis leading to best practice in this area, PERF assembled a prestigious group of professionals and other stakeholders to create guidelines to assist departments across the country in addressing this potential threat to public safety.

The work group developed a series of guidelines for a patrol-level response to a suicide bomb threat. These guidelines represent the latest thinking from some of the top names in counter-terrorism training and tactical response, and encompass recommendations on threat assessment, operations, and training. By disseminating this information to as wide a range of police agencies across the country as possible, we will be heightening officer awareness, spurring further discussion of the issue, and lessening the possibility of a tragic outcome should the hypothetical threat become a horrible reality.
The Metropolitan Police Service has more than 30 years of experience dealing with terrorist attacks on the streets of London, but the July 7, 2005 attacks on our public transport system were a type of onslaught that was new to the city: “suicide bomber” attacks. It is impossible to overstate the impact that those assaults had on the Metropolitan Police Service, just as the police departments of the United States were changed forever by the 9/11 suicide bombers’ attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

I asked Assistant Commissioner Stephen House to contact the Police Executive Research Forum in order to progress further study of what policing agencies in the United States and the UK are doing to plan for attacks by suicide bombers. It is important that our two nations continue to work together to consider what this new threat means to police departments.

One thing we have learned is that developing a response to counter the threat of a suicide bomber will not be successfully achieved by the police service acting alone. Even with the best police work, it will be communities that uncover terrorists and defeat terror. That is why it is essential to build trust through strong working partnerships between communities and the police, involving all levels of government as well as voluntary and private-sector organizations. All have a crucial contribution to make in protecting our citizens.

It is also important to understand that while there is always the need to protect operationally sensitive tactics, we must share policing plans with those to whom we are held to account. Police management and oversight authorities must ensure that plans are appropriate and proportionate, while they hold police to account and inform citizens about police activities, objectives, and outcomes.

The changed threat, referred to in London as the “New Normality,” demands that we identify new ways of working. But our efforts to counter terrorism must not become separated from mainstream policing as a new discipline. Terrorism is a crime, and like other crimes, it can be successfully frustrated through tried and proven approaches in policing—visible patrol, intelligence, forensics, and detection. Efforts to counter terrorism must not become separated from mainstream policing as a new discipline of science.

Successful resolution of such complex events also requires the highest level of training to ensure that officers fully understand their agencies’ plans and make the best decisions at all levels. We are very proud of our Hydra and Minerva simulation training systems, developed within the Police Service, in which officers train in a specially-built facility to simulate the complexity, chaos, and challenges of real-time incidents. The approach allows officers to participate in scenarios that test and develop their operational decision-making and professional skills.

The MPS has developed strong operational frameworks to respond to terrorist threats and incidents, to provide security and reassurance to the people of London, and to protect the city’s infrastructure. We must continually search to improve our response and find the best measures to protect our citizens and the cities that we serve. That is why it is so important that PERF, with the support of the Metropolitan Police Service, New Scotland Yard, has developed this essential guidance for first-response officers. By preparing officers for the threat of suicide bombers and training them to respond effectively, we can disrupt terrorism and save life.
Suicide bombers in the United States? That seems to be one of many of the dire challenges facing local law enforcement in America today. The answer seems to be more of a question of ‘when’ and not ‘if,’ but no one can be absolutely sure. However, as the target of four suicide bombing attempts while heading the U.S. Department of State Police Advisory Mission in Iraq from 2004 to 2006, I can speak with absolute certainty about the outcomes of such attacks: chaotic aftermaths, unprecedented frustration at the enemy’s ability to strike with relative impunity, and frenzied searches for countermeasures.

As we tried to rebuild Iraq’s Police Service, 13 U.S. police advisors under my command lost their lives; those losses were overwhelmingly tied to suicide bombers using improvised explosive devices against us and against what we represented. For me, there were never the right words to express the depth of our grief to those officers’ families. Multiply those scenarios, which were my personal experience, against the impact of the thousands of civilian Iraqi casualties by suicide bombers, and you have a measurable sense of just how quickly any sense of order can devolve out of control.

The public safety of our communities, our management of the risk to our police officers, and our control of the consequences of such attacks lie in five elements:

- First, we must develop technology that detects, neutralizes, or destroys suicide bomb threats at either a speed or distance that minimizes risk. In this effort, agencies in the defense industry, such as the Department of Defense and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, are expending blood, sweat and tears to find and develop that life-saving technology.

- Second, we must continue to pursue and strike the enemy where he begins production or planning of such attacks. Once the threat is deployed and our adversaries are on the move against their targets, our ability to mitigate or defeat that threat is severely compromised.

- Third, we must never dismiss the experiences of law enforcement professionals who have dealt with the specter of such attacks for decades. We must embrace, in particular, our Israeli and British counterparts, to whom we can turn for lessons learned. The concept of ‘jointness’ cannot be overstated.

- Fourth, we must recognize that it is the patrol officer on the street who will be the first to confront this threat on American soil. We will not have the luxury of containment and a traditional Explosive Ordnance Disposal response. We must train patrol officers in the most foreign and unthinkable scenarios that they have ever faced.

- Fifth and finally, it is not just technology or street skills that will save us. It is the development of real time intelligence that reveals the enemy’s intentions, tactics and strategies.

In Iraq, we continuously tried to understand and forecast the enemy course of action. Regrettably, we must now bring that military concept home to the domestic front.
“U.S. Air Force (USAF) Staff Sergeant (SSGT) Phillips, an Explosive Ordnances and Devices (EOD) specialist from the 824th Airborne Red Horse (ARH), examines a bomb attached to a simulated suicide bomber during a Safe Flag exercise at Avon Park Air Range, Florida (FL). Safe Flag exercise is designed to ready troops to become a highly capable and responsive team when opening air bases worldwide.” Photo by SSGT Matthew Hannen (USAF), courtesy of Department of Defense (released to public).
OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH METHODS

Prior to the development of PERF’s “Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Guidelines for Consideration,” little had been offered, nationally, to police departments about this topic. Our international colleagues, specifically Israel and more recently the United Kingdom, appear to have developed the majority of the responses to suicide bomb threats as a direct result of their experiences. The United States is less prepared, perhaps because of limited experiences, other priorities, and/or the sheer number of departments nationwide to coordinate. Other challenges to preparedness include the complexity of the issue, the belief of some that an attack is not imminent, and the feeling that there is little that can be done to prepare for such an unpredictable event.

PERF set out to examine the issues pertaining to suicide bomb threat response, identify American and international departments that have developed policy and/or tactics to address such threats, and develop guidelines that could assist departments in preparing for a suicide bomb incident. The research model included: a conference and summit with stakeholders, site visits, interviews, and review of open-source and restricted data for relevant articles, training materials, and/or protocols.

Initial Conference: Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response

PERF began this project with the first of two stakeholders meetings, the Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response Conference, on March 31, 2006 in Washington, D.C. The 50 participants were from federal, state, and local policing agencies in the United States; policing units in Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Israel; and private-sector partners, including the Memphis Shelby Crime Commission and the Center for Technology Commercialization (See Appendices 1 and 2 for the Participant List and Agenda respectively). The conference participants discussed the nature of suicide bombing missions, international experiences, and challenges to policy and training development and implementation. They also identified policy concerns, such as whether a police agency’s suicide bomb policies should be developed as a separate document or should be encapsulated into the general use-of-force policy. This work allowed the PERF staff to begin developing the guidelines, as well as to identify site visits and further research that would be necessary to complete the project.

PERF Interview Guide

PERF developed an interview guide to facilitate discussion during the site visits and interviews (See Appendix 5). This guide was designed to help the interviewers focus their research on certain topics, such as: whether a police agency’s existing policies specifically addressed suicide bombers; how an agency would respond to various scenarios suggesting that a suicide bombing might be imminent; agencies’ use of various terms regarding suicide bombings; agencies’ use of bomb squads; and the specific tactics that patrol officers are taught to address threats of suicide bombers.
Site Visits
PERF conducted site visits with the following police departments/agencies: New York City; Los Angeles; U.S. Capitol Police; Metropolitan Police Service of London; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Secret Service; and the Israel Police Force. During each site visit, PERF staffers met with bomb squad specialists, special weapons and tactics (SWAT) and related specialized units, counter-terrorism units, and patrol divisions. Site visits were integral to identifying department policies, procedures, equipment, and future needs with regard to suicide bomb threat response.

Interviews
In addition to the interviews conducted during the site visits, PERF interviewed a number of individuals with expertise in this area, including Terry Gainer, then-chief of the U.S. Capitol Police; Major General Mickey Levy, former Israel Police commander of the district of Jerusalem; and Michael Heidingsfield, former U.S. State Department Police Advisor to Iraqi Police Forces. Interviews also included various meetings and briefings attended by PERF staff to obtain further insight on the topic:

- The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Bombing Prevention held an Advisory Group Conference on December 4–5, 2006 to discuss a national strategy for bombing prevention to present to the President.

- The Forum on Crime & Justice, a University of Pennsylvania program that brings federal legislative- and executive-branch officials together with criminal justice practitioners and other leaders to discuss critical issues, held a luncheon discussion on suicide bombers on August 25, 2006. Speakers included Chief (and former PERF President) Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle; Chief Liz Wollen, University of Oklahoma; and Jeff Fuller of the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board.

- The International Law Enforcement Forum, an international network of security professionals, held an event on November 7–9, 2006 to discuss a myriad of topics pertinent to international policing communities and less-lethal force alternatives, including suicide bomb response and the potential use of chemical “calmatives” to incapacitate individuals or crowds.

- The Federal Bureau of Investigation created two multicast DVDs related to suicide bombing threats. The multicasts feature prominent police chiefs and federal officials talking about preparedness and response to threats and related situations.

Data

Open-Source Data
PERF utilized open-source materials such as: academic articles related to suicide bomber ideologies and evolutions; military documents related to explosives and standoff distances; police doctrines such as active-shooter protocols; explosives training materials offered by government and private-sector sources; and media reports of bombing incidents. A sample of articles and documents reviewed include: Robert Pape’s *The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism*; the Institute of Land Warfare’s paper on *Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (2004); Penn State University’s *Advantages and Limitations of Calmatives for Use as a Non-Lethal Technique* (2000); and Department of the Army, National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), Intelligence and Security Command’s *Improvised Explosive Device Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet*. All of this information was useful in understanding the wide picture of suicide bomb threats, policing, and society at large, as well as the specifics of thwarting such attacks, such as training opportunities and tactics.

Restricted Data
PERF examined restricted-source data from police departments, bomb specialists, policing and specialized membership organizations, and other sources. These documents are labeled “sensitive,” “for law enforcement only,” “for official use only,” and so on. The material contained in the documents included information such as specific tactical maneuvers and drafts of departmental protocols.
GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT AND REVIEW PROCESS

The PERF site visits, interviews, and open and restricted-source research led to the development of nearly 100 initial draft Guidelines for Consideration regarding patrol-level response to a suicide bomb threat. **The overall purpose of the guidelines was to answer the question: What should first responders do—and what should they not do—when encountering a potential suicide bomber?**

The guideline development process posed a challenge: Those drafting the guidelines strove to avoid too much specificity, which could render guidelines inapplicable to certain agencies, but also to avoid writing guidelines that were so general they would fail to offer much assistance. Guidelines often were based on multiple sources of information; in some cases guidelines were based on a strong consensus in the literature and research, while other guidelines reflected a melding of several perspectives. Guidelines were first vetted by PERF executive management and lead researchers on the project. As a result of this review, guidelines were revised, eliminated or newly created.

Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit

The most critical step in the process was the vetting of the guidelines at the summit meeting in Baltimore on January 17–18, 2007. Participants from the previous conference were invited, as well as others identified during the project, to review the PERF proposed guidelines, protocol, and glossary. (See Appendices 3 and 4 for the Participant List and Agenda respectively.) Prior to the summit, the guidelines and supporting materials (the Glossary and the Graduated Force Options Protocol) were sent to each participant for preliminary review. Participants were asked to review the guidelines with their police leadership and bring feedback to the summit. During this event, participants from more than 30 policing agencies, both national and international, revised the guidelines through discussion and debate on each guideline’s appropriateness to policy and/or training domains for individual departments. The event highlighted the complexities and sensitivities surrounding various preparedness and response methods that could be utilized. However, it was abundantly clear that most departments wanted national guidelines to help them begin developing policies within their own agencies. Nearly two days’ worth of discussion regarding the guidelines resulted in another evolution of the process, with the nearly 100 initial draft guidelines boiled down to 68 vetted guidelines.

Guideline Considerations

The Guidelines for Consideration were finalized and vetted by PERF. Feedback from Summit participants resulted in modification of some guidelines, elimination of others, and creation of new ones. Inclusion of guidelines in the final document (and exclusion of others through the vetting process) are not meant to imply 100-percent consensus. PERF took into consideration all feedback and comments related to each guideline. And while the guidelines may not necessarily reflect the individual views of each participant or each participating department, they do reflect the amassed wealth of knowledge collected during this project regarding suicide bomb threat preparation and response.

PERF recognizes that each potential suicide bomb threat will include a dynamic set of variables that may not be fully covered by each guideline. The guidelines do not discount the need for proper training in risk and situational assessments. **Further, the guidelines are meant to be considered in conjunction with existing use-of-force policies and training protocols.** Departments should consult their legal counsel prior to guideline implementation to ensure that the guidelines are legally sound and acceptable within their jurisdiction and in conjunction with other legal requirements. This legal review will also encourage the cooperation of local government officials and employees in a comprehensive and collective approach to this very sensitive issue. Further, guidelines should be examined in the context of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and coordinated at the local, state, regional and federal levels as most appropriate.
The following guidance alone will not prevent or successfully eliminate threats of suicide bombing incidents. However, our goal is to provide some assistance to preparing for a sensitive and complex issue: first-responder actions in a suicide bomb threat situation.

Description of the Glossary of Terms

The Glossary of Terms was developed early in PERF’s work to ensure that the research staff was using terminology consistently and uniformly in discussions. Further, PERF identified subtleties in terminology and definitions during site visits and interviews that, if not clarified with a glossary, could have led to confusion when speaking about the topic to a wider audience.

Items were included in the glossary if they commonly appeared in research or conversation regarding the topic. Definitions were adopted using open source materials, departmental definitions, or a hybrid of both. This glossary proved useful in developing guidelines and sharing them with others.

The glossary was also vetted through the Summit participants and modified as necessary.

Description of the Graduated Force Options Protocol

PERF developed the Graduated Force Options Protocol, a visual tool to use in conjunction with the guidelines, to demonstrate how threat assessments of various suicide bomb incident scenarios lead to different levels of intervention and force. Although each scenario is likely to be different, a threat assessment must take place based on the scenario, and an intervention level will be determined based on the assessment. Assessments are not static and may in fact change as the scenario develops. Therefore, continual assessments may change the level of intervention applied to each scenario. The Graduated Force Options Protocol is meant to highlight the various dynamics related to assessments and interventions while also allowing mobility between the categories as the threat changes. The Protocol should be considered as a tool in conjunction with the Guidelines for Consideration.
Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration

GENERAL

1. Generally, the principles of an agency’s suicide bomb response protocols should be consistent with an agency’s use of force policies, procedures and training.

2. Similarly, the principles of an agency’s active shooter protocol should be considered in the development of the suicide bomb response policy.

3. Law enforcement agencies should create a stand alone policy and/or training curriculum addressing the response to suicide bomb threats.

4. The suicide bomb response policy should state clear strategic objectives that include:
   - Preservation of life;
   - Prevention and reduction of the impact of terrorism;
   - Providing for responses that include other agencies; and
   - Providing a framework for law enforcement and emergency response for other similar incidents of crime, significant accidents, or natural emergencies.

5. A suicide bomb response policy should include incident response and contingency plans for pre-incident, incident, and post-incident phases, as well as address required support unit response.

6. Policy development should include a review of officers’ legal authority and tactics (on private and public property).

7. Agencies’ suicide bomb response policies should be flexible in order to adapt to the variation in threats and level of response.

8. Agencies should develop strong operational linkages between patrol and SWAT, bomb squad and specialized units.

9. Agencies should partner with other public and private organizations, as necessary, to develop interagency and multijurisdictional collaboration, policy, planning and training.

10. In developing a suicide bomber response protocol, agencies should consider graduated use of force options consistent with the department’s use of force policies (see suggested suicide bomb Graduated Force Option Protocol).

11. Officers should consider the suicide bomb graduated force option protocol prior to the use of deadly force.

12. In the event of any suicide bomb threat, a supervisor should immediately respond and take charge.

13. Upon confirmation of a credible suicide bomb threat, a member of the executive command should assume responsibility for the incident as soon as practical.

NOTE: Words/phrases in boldface in the guidelines are included in the glossary of terms. Some guidelines are repeated because they are applicable to more than one section of the document.
14. Agencies should consult, inform and engage elected and other community leaders about suicide bomb response policies.

Threat and Risk Assessments

15. Agency response plans should include processes that require the completion of threat and risk assessments and the extent of the danger posed to police and the public.
   a. Threat assessments should include:
      ■ Location of the incident, whether contained, static or mobile;
      ■ The method of the attacker (i.e., bomb worn on the body, carried, or in a vehicle);
      ■ Descriptions of suspects and suspected devices; and
      ■ If possible, identify the intended/possible target (e.g. crowded public spaces, notable buildings, events, VIP presence, etc.).
   b. Risk assessment should include:
      ■ Danger posed by the device and potential evacuation area size;
      ■ Risks of evacuation (versus sending to cover);
      ■ Hazards and danger to emergency responders; and
      ■ Other safety issues.
   c. Responders should continue to review the threat and risk assessments throughout the incident and consider designating a specific officer to that task.

OPERATIONS AND TACTICS

Communications

16. Officers should limit the use of electronic communications in close proximity to a suspected suicide bomber.

17. Officers should position themselves at least 100 ft. (6 police car lengths) away from a suspect if they use a handheld police radio (0-29 watts) in proximity to a suspected suicide bomber.

18. Officers should position themselves at least 170 ft. (10 police car lengths) away from a suspect if they use a vehicle-mounted police radio (30-49 watts) in proximity to a suspected suicide bomber.

19. Upon arrival at the scene, responding officers should report the following information:
   ■ Location of suspect and officer;
   ■ Description of suspect and/or device;
   ■ Areas/streets unsafe for responding units or general public to enter;
   ■ Number and location of innocent persons in close proximity to suspect; and
   ■ Presence of any injured persons and the possibility of safe evacuation.

20. Officers should request the response of specialized support units when threat and risk assessment dictates such a response.

Safe Distances and Evacuations

21. When possible, officers should confront a suspected suicide bomber in an isolated or less populated area.

22. While every effort should be made to maintain a safe distance from a suicide bomb suspect, there may be unanticipated situations in which officers find themselves within close proximity to the suspect. Under these extreme circumstances, it may be necessary to grab a suspect’s arms and keep them away from the torso or in some other restraint tactic.

23. If the bomber is on the ground while detained by an officer(s), officers should restrain the suspect’s hands to prevent movement.

24. When maintaining a safe distance, officers should seek cover from a potential blast, heat and shrapnel from both the device and other objects (glass, bomb debris, etc.).
25. Officers should attempt to contain the suspected suicide bomber, and should not allow the suspect to leave the area or enter a vehicle.

26. In general, take cover and attempt to maintain a safe standoff distance from a suspected suicide bomber.\(^9\)

27. If a suspect is aware of the officers’ presence, officers should not close on these distances to negotiate with, or handcuff, a suspect.\(^10\)

28. Where applicable, officers should evacuate endangered citizens.

29. In evacuation decisions, officers should consider background and collateral injuries to bystanders upon the possible detonation of an explosive device.

30. Officers should be aware that evacuation of persons from public areas or buildings can carry as great of a risk as keeping them in place.

31. Locking or making a building secure at the time of the threat or attack can disrupt an attacker’s movements, bar entry and save lives (be mindful that a need may arise to evacuate premises soon after).

32. Officers should remain vigilant in their efforts to detect secondary devices, additional suspects or attacks. Consideration should be given to deploying plainclothes officers to conduct such duties.

33. Agencies should maintain different color perimeter tape to designate inner and outer perimeters (e.g. red and yellow).

34. Consider all suspected bombs live devices.

35. If available, and if time allows, plainclothes officers should respond to conduct surveillance and assess the situation in a possible suicide bomb threat.

36. Patrol vehicles should include specific equipment needed to implement suicide bomb/critical incident plans. Equipment may include:
   - 3 rolls each of inner and outer perimeter tape
   - Megaphone/bullhorn
   - Maps
   - Personal Protective Equipment
   - Visibility gear
   - Reference/flashcards
   - Copies of operational plans
   - Decision logs
   - Radiation Protection Pagers
   - Gauze masks; eyewear; gloves and boot coverings

37. Officers should not use Conducted Energy Devices on a suspected suicide bomber.

38. Shooting an area of the body that might contain a bomb carries an increased risk of detonation.

39. If the area is secure and contained, officers should generally not approach a suspect (bag, vehicle, or body), even if a suspect is willing to surrender (or appears to be dead/incapacitated) until the explosives are rendered safe by bomb technicians.

40. In order to manage the police response to a suicide bomb threat, agencies should consider developing suggested defined tasks for the first officers arriving on the scene with three primary objectives:
   a. Identify, locate, and contain the suspect, take cover, pass information back to a command center, and challenge the suspect if appropriate.

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\(^9\) See the U.S. Army, National Ground Intelligence Center’s IED Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet in Appendix 6.

\(^10\) Ibid.
b. Focus on warning bystanders, clearing the immediate vicinity of people, and securing witnesses/informants.

c. Conduct perimeter search and surveillance activities, seeking secondary devices and/or accomplices.

41. To avoid confusion and conflicting messages, a single lead officer should be designated to communicate with the suspect.

42. The deployment of a canine in order to intercept a suspected suicide bomber may be considered.

43. Officers should attempt to seek compliance/surrender of a suspected suicide bomber.

If the Suicide Bomb Suspect is Compliant

44. Officers should order the suspect to show his/her hands with palms open.

45. When responding officers identify a suspect in possession of a bomb, they should order the suspect to gently and slowly place the object on the ground and have the suspect step away from the device.

46. If the bomber wants to surrender, officers should order him/her to remove all explosives and clothing, and turn 360 degrees. Items should be gently placed on the ground.

47. Officers should avoid ordering the suspect to drop to his knees or lie on the ground. Some bomb switches are located in the chest or waist area and may cause the explosive device to detonate if the suspect lies down.

If Suicide Bomb Suspect is Noncompliant

48. If the suicide bomb suspect is contained and at a safe distance from others, attempts should be made to negotiate with the suspect to resolve the situation without the need to use deadly force.

49. Based on the actions of the suspect (e.g. the officers have established probable cause to believe the suspect is in possession of an explosive device) and the officers’ belief that the suspect represents an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officers or others, officers may need to utilize deadly force to incapacitate the suspect and/or prevent detonation.

50. Shooting an area of the body that might contain a bomb carries increased risk of detonation.

TRAINING

Behavioral Anomalies

51. Law enforcement officers should focus on behaviors rather than age, race, ethnicity, and gender in regard to suicide bomber suspects.

52. Suicide bomb suspects may display behavioral anomalies that would draw attention to themselves (such as behaviors or indicators that would be out of the ordinary). However, law enforcement agencies should work to develop skills in identifying behavioral anomalies. Anomalies include:

a. Irregularity—something that deviates from the norm or from expectations.

b. Peculiarity—something strange and difficult to identify or classify.

General Training

53. Law enforcement agencies should create a stand alone policy and/or training curriculum addressing the response to suicide bomb threats.

54. Suicide bomb training should include decision making and critical thinking components in order to strengthen an officer’s ability to conduct a situational assessment.

55. Patrol officer training should regularly include bomb technicians and representatives from partner agencies as expert presenters.
56. Officers should be aware that a suicide bomb triggering device may be in hands, on belt, waistband and/or chest. Triggers may also be held by a third party (handler) in the crowd.

57. Suicide bomb response training for patrol officers should incorporate live explosives demonstrations to highlight realistic threats.

58. Training should provide a comprehensive understanding of suicide bomb preparation and delivery processes (e.g. recruiting, training; planning, reconnaissance, surveillance; bomb assembly; support, etc.).

59. Patrol officers should receive suicide bomb-making recognition training—enabling them to detect/identify bomb making equipment, odors, supplies and other paraphernalia (such as explosive device switches and various types of both commercial and homemade explosive materials).

60. Dedicated in-service training should be considered for patrol officers on terrorism/suicide bomb intelligence, situational assessments, and explosives recognition. Training should include tabletop exercises, simulation-based training and/or role-playing activities.

61. Terrorism and suicide bomb topics (to include current events) should occur regularly in roll call training and agency bulletins.

62. Training should include multiple variations of an incident (e.g. number of bombers, threats and other hazards) as well as variation in the numbers of responding officers.

63. Training should include exercises that simulate terrorist activities to be played out by a group of officers to test and better prepare responses to such situations (e.g. the purchase of explosive materials at a local hardware store, parking a large vehicle in front of a precinct, etc.).

64. Training should include instructions not to approach the bomber, even if dead/incapacitated, wounded or apparently willing to surrender. In this scenario, officers should be aware that a threat still exists; and the bomber may be attempting to initiate the explosive device when officers approach.

65. Agencies should develop training for officers that allows them to make contact with, and immobilize, suspected suicide bombers when deadly force is not reasonable (intermediate strategies).

66. Training should include instructions not to use a Conducted Energy Device on a suspected suicide bomber.

67. Training should include use of force options to incapacitate suicide bombers.

68. Training should incorporate the Department of Homeland Security’s reference library (known as TRIPwire), for contemporary suicide bomb/terrorism information.
## Graduated Force Option Protocol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>THREAT ASSESSMENT</strong></th>
<th><strong>SUICIDE BOMB INCIDENT SCENARIO</strong></th>
<th><strong>GRADUATED FORCE INTERVENTION LEVEL</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td>Person acting suspiciously and:</td>
<td>Citizen contact: Conventional stop and/or frisk without firearms drawn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. No device seen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. No intelligence other than call</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Possibly some behavioral anomalies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td>Person acting suspiciously and:</td>
<td>Armed felony stop (including less lethal options—not CED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. No device seen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Suspicion from intelligence,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>information, or behavioral anomaly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td>Suicide bomb device observed or</td>
<td>Armed Intervention <em>Graduated Force Option Sequence</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>probable cause that device is</td>
<td>1. When feasible, warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>present.</td>
<td>2. Critical shot to incapacitate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detonation
PERF Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Glossary of Terms

A

Active Shooter — An active shooter is an armed person who has used deadly physical force on other persons and continues to do so while having unrestricted access to additional victims.

Active Shooter Protocol — An agency protocol for addressing a situation involving an active shooter (see above).

Authorization to Use Deadly Force — An officer is authorized to use lethal force when it reasonably appears necessary: to protect himself or others from an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury; or to prevent a crime where the suspect’s actions place persons in jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or to apprehend a fleeing felon for a crime involving serious bodily injury or the use of lethal force where there is substantial risk that the person whose arrest is sought will cause death or serious bodily injury to others if apprehension is delayed.

B

Bomb — Any article, detonated by mechanical or electrical means, which may possibly contain chemical, gas, liquid or other substance capable of causing a fire, explosion, burn, or other chemical reaction intended to cause injury to a person or result in damage and/or destruction of property.

Bomb Threat — Any communication, including written correspondences or telephone calls, received by the public or a member of the service, indicating that an explosive device has been, or will be placed at a particular location(s).

C

Conducted Energy Device (CED) — A weapon primarily designed to disrupt a subject’s central nervous system by means of deploying electrical energy sufficient to cause uncontrolled muscle contractions and override an individual’s voluntary motor responses.

Contained — An incident is fixed at a location, or law enforcement has secured the scene so that a suspect(s) is unable to move away from that point.

D

Deadly Force — Any tactic or use of force that has an intended, natural, and probable consequence of serious physical injury or death.

E

Executive Command — A level/rank of law enforcement leadership that is beyond simply operational or supervisory, and which maintains responsibility for the wider resources of the agency.

G

Graduated Force Option Protocol — A graduated use of force model that may be considered when responding to a threat of a suicide bomb suspect.
Graduated Use of Force — A training philosophy that supports the progressive and reasonable escalation and de-escalation of officer-applied force in proportional response to the actions and level of resistance offered by a suspect. The level of response is based upon the situation encountered at the scene and the actions of the suspect in response to the officer’s commands. Such a response may progress from the officer’s physical presence at the scene to the application of deadly force.

Handler — A person who delivers a bomb to a suicide bomber and then escorts them to the target. The handler also provides security and instruction on how to detonate the bomb.

Homicide Bomber — See suicide bomber.

Incapacitate — To make someone unable to perform a certain action.

Inner and Outer Perimeter Tape — The inner perimeter tape in a suicide bomb threat situation is used to alert law enforcement personnel of danger from the possible detonation of an explosive device or to secure an area immediately adjacent to where such an incident occurred. The outer perimeter tape is used to protect others from similar risks or to secure the area adjacent to the inner perimeter.

Mobile — A suicide bomb incident/suspect is not at a fixed location, and suspects are traveling or moving, and law enforcement has not secured the scene.

Probable Cause — Knowledge of articulable facts or circumstances that are objectively, and without resort to arbitrary profiling, sufficient to induce a reasonable person under the attendant circumstances to believe that an individual has committed or is committing a criminal offense or an infraction.

Reasonable Suspicion — Knowledge of articulable facts or circumstances that are objectively, and without resort to arbitrary profiling, sufficient to induce a reasonable person under the attendant circumstances to suspect that an individual has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in criminal activity.

Secondary Devices — Explosive devices placed at the scene of an ongoing emergency response that are intended to cause casualties among responders. Secondary explosive devices are designed to explode after a primary explosion or other major emergency response event that has attracted large numbers of responders to the scene in order to inflict additional injury, damage, and fear.

Specialized Units — Law enforcement and/or emergency response personnel trained in unique areas that require particular knowledge and skills. Examples include: special weapons; bomb disposal; air support; hostage negotiation; investigations; media interaction; surveillance; hazardous materials; and canines.

Stand Alone Policy — An agency sanctioned document that is specific to an issue or circumstance focusing narrowly on the subject.

Static — A suicide bomb incident/suspect is stationary at a point or location, but, which has not been secured by law enforcement personnel.

Suicide Belt/Vest — A garment filled with explosive materials and armed with a detonator (toggle or rocker-type switch attached to the mid-section of the device or handheld), worn by suicide bombers. Explosive belts and vests are usually
packed with nails, screws, bolts, and other objects that serve as shrapnel to maximize the number of casualties in the explosion. Belts and vests may contain some types of anticoagulant making them more deadly.

- Belts may be worn on the stomach or lower abdomen area.
- Vests may be worn on the chest and stomach area. They often have shoulder straps.

**Suicide Bomber** — An individual (including a terrorist) who is willing to die by means of an explosion in order to kill or injure other people and/or cause property damage.

**Suicide Bombing** — An attack using explosives on people or property, committed by a person who knows the explosion will cause his or her own death.

**Suicide Mission** — A scheme in which planning takes place to facilitate a person killing him/herself by means of an explosion in order to kill or injure other people and/or cause property damage.

**Surrogate** — A third party or person who is used to transport, carry or wear a bomb or improvised device, whether knowingly (by coercion or threat) or innocently (without knowledge of the explosives).

**Terrorist** — A person who employs terror as a political weapon.

**Third-Party Attackers** — Additional suspect(s) in a suicide bombing that may include support team to the initial attack phase (transport, logistics, lookout, camera operator, and third-party explosive detonator) or second phase (suspects that launch a further attack after the primary assault).

**TRIPwire** — Technical Resource for Incident Prevention: an online, collaborative, information-sharing network for bomb squads and other law enforcement officials to learn about current terrorist bombing tactics, techniques, and procedures, including improvised explosive device (IED) design and emplacement.
Lisa L. Spahr
Lisa Spahr is an Associate for Police Executive Research Forum’s (PERF) Center on Force and Accountability (CFA). She has more than 14 years of experience in research and development in various areas including law enforcement, military applications, and the dual field of law and psychiatry. At PERF, Ms. Spahr manages multiple research projects, including: the 2006 Critical Issues in Policing Series, patrol response to suicide bombing threats; redesigning an officer discipline system; less lethal weapons’ impact on injuries and liabilities; and identifying effective homicide investigative strategies.

Prior to joining PERF, Ms. Spahr served as a project manager for the University of Pittsburgh, Law and Psychiatry Research Department, interviewing psychopaths in prisons and juvenile detention facilities. In this capacity, she screened and interviewed more than 400 prisoners, trained interviewers on various interviewing techniques, and administered a battery of clinical assessments. Ms. Spahr has also served as adjunct faculty, instructing in both law enforcement and psychology coursework, and has managed a community corrections facility in Philadelphia. She has traveled extensively and has experience working with both international and domestic policing communities.

Ms. Spahr received her Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology from Temple University in Philadelphia, and Master of Science degree in investigative psychology from the University of Liverpool, England. She is a member of the American Psychological Association, the Psychology-Law Society, and the American Society of Criminology.

Josh Ederheimer
Joshua Ederheimer is a Captain with the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia. He is currently serving in the Executive Office of the Chief, coordinating the transition efforts for newly appointed police Chief Cathy L. Lanier.

Captain Ederheimer is the former Director of the Police Executive Research Forum’s (PERF) Center on Force & Accountability (CFA) in Washington, D.C. He joined PERF in January 2004, as a Senior Associate after a successful career with the Metropolitan Police Department. He subsequently returned to MPD in January 2007.

At MPD, he had attained the rank of Inspector and was named Director of the D.C. Police Civil Rights and Force Investigations Division. During his tenure at the MPD, he acquired expertise as a commanding officer in several areas, including: internal affairs; use of force; equal employment opportunity; and civil rights divisions. Captain Ederheimer reengineered numerous processes, and developed and led several operational units that emerged as national models in such areas as: internal and force investigations; consent decree implementation, police accountability, policing in public housing, and environmental crimes investigations.

He specializes in police leadership, management reform, and business process reengineering. Captain Ederheimer is also an adjunct professor at American University’s Department of Law, Justice, and Society, where he has taught both graduate and undergraduate courses. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in justice from American University, and a Master’s Degree in management from Johns Hopkins University.
David Bilson
Chief Superintendent David Bilson has served in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), New Scotland Yard, London, for over 28 years. He has substantial borough policing experience at operational and command levels in addition to more strategic posts at command group and corporate headquarters levels. He has worked on policy and program development; leadership, performance and review frameworks; and in internal affairs investigations. He holds a Master’s Degree in Business Administration from Middlesex University, where he attended full-time on an MPS Scholarship, completing research to develop a model for police leadership.

For the past three years Chief Superintendent Bilson has been focused on the development of police performance metrics and operational frameworks within the operational commands, with partner agencies and at group command and corporate levels. He has continued to develop his knowledge of performance metrics, frameworks and mapping systems through field research visits to U.S. policing agencies in Philadelphia, New York, Baltimore, Chicago, Newark and Washington. Currently, he is a Fellow at PERF, contributing his international experience to a host of ongoing projects.
The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) is a professional organization of progressive chief executives of city, county and state law enforcement agencies who collectively serve more than 50 percent of the U.S. population. In addition, PERF has established formal relationships with international police executives and law enforcement organizations from around the globe. Membership includes police chiefs, superintendents, sheriffs, state police directors, university police chiefs, public safety directors, and other law enforcement professionals. Established in 1976 as a non-profit organization, PERF is unique in its commitment to the application of research in policing and the importance of higher education for police executives. Besides a commitment to police innovation and professionalism, PERF members must hold a four-year college degree.

PERF continues to conduct some of the most innovative police and criminal justice research and provides a wide variety of management and technical assistance programs to police agencies throughout the world. PERF’s groundbreaking work on community and problem-oriented policing, racial profiling, use of force, less lethal weapons, and crime reduction strategies has earned it a prominent position in the police community. PERF continues to work toward increased professionalism and excellence in the field through its publications and training programs. PERF sponsors and conducts the Senior Management Institute for Police (SMIP). This program provides comprehensive professional management and executive development training to police chiefs and law enforcement executives. Convened annually in Boston, SMIP instructors include professors from leading universities, though they are primarily from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.

PERF’s success is built on the active involvement of its members. The organization also has types of membership that allow it to benefit from the diverse views of criminal justice researchers, law enforcement professionals of all ranks and others committed to advancing policing services to all communities. As a nonprofit organization, PERF is committed to the application of research in policing and to promoting innovation that will enhance the quality of life in our communities. PERF’s objective is to improve the delivery of police services and the effectiveness of crime control through the exercise of strong national leadership, the public debate of criminal justice issues, the development of a body of research about policing and the provision of vital management services to all police agencies.

PERF has developed and published some of the leading literature in the law enforcement field. Recently, PERF released three publications on contemporary law enforcement issues. The books—entitled *Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force*, *Police Management of Mass Demonstrations: Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches* and *A Gathering Storm—Violent Crime in America*—serve as practical guides to help police leaders make more informed decisions. In addition, PERF has released a series of white papers on terrorism in the local law enforcement context, including: *Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement*, which examined such issues as local-federal partnerships, working with diverse communities, bioterrorism, and intelligence sharing. Other publications include *Increasing Community-Police...*

Other publications in the “Critical Issues in Policing” series are:

Challenge to Change: The 21st Century Policing Project
Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force
Police Management of Mass Demonstrations
A Gathering Storm—Violent Crime in America
Violent Crime in America: 24 Months of Alarming Trends
Police Planning for an Influenza Pandemic: Case Studies and Lessons from the Field
Strategies for Resolving Conflict and Minimizing Use of Force

To learn more about PERF, visit www.policeforum.org.
Created in April 2005, the PERF Center on Force and Accountability (CFA) is designed to be a significant resource for PERF members and others in law enforcement, and to serve as the principal clearinghouse for ideas, strategies, and data that will address problems related to police use of force and accountability. Ultimately, the CFA provides law enforcement executives with information and strategies that will help them make more informed decisions as they serve their communities.

The PERF Center on Force and Accountability has four primary objectives:

- Identify emerging trends and seek effective new strategies;
- Conduct groundbreaking research;
- Provide high quality technical assistance to law enforcement agencies;
- Create a central resource for information regarding use-of-force and police accountability issues.

To that end, the CFA is continually developing competencies in several specific areas. For use of force, CFA competencies include community outreach and accountability; equipment and weapons; investigations; police canines; policy development; review boards; tactics; technology; training; trends and identification of promising approaches; statistics, tracking, and analysis; vehicle pursuits; and violence against law enforcement officers. As it relates to police accountability, CFA competencies include community involvement; consent decrees/memoranda of agreement; discipline and conduct review; early intervention systems and processes; equal employment opportunities; internal investigations; law enforcement ethics; misconduct statistics, tracking, and analysis; policy development; technology; training; and trends and identification of promising approaches.

The CFA released national guidelines for conducted energy devices that have been embraced by law enforcement agencies throughout the country. Most recently, the CFA gained national recognition for work conducted on the rise in violent crime. The outcome was a 2006 publication entitled, *A Gathering Storm—Violent Crime in America*. Further, the CFA completed two guides on early intervention systems to help agencies better manage their human resources. The CFA provided technical assistance to municipalities seeking to assess their use of force and disciplinary systems within their police departments. The CFA also examined critical use of force issues in a 2005 publication entitled *Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force*, and a 2006 publication entitled *Strategies for Resolving Conflict and Minimizing Use of Force*.

To learn more about PERF and the Center on Force & Accountability, visit www.policeforum.org.
Motorola is a Fortune 100 global communications leader that provides seamless mobility products and solutions across broadband, embedded systems and wireless networks. Seamless mobility means you can reach the people, things and information you need in your home, auto, workplace and all spaces in between. Seamless mobility harnesses the power of technology convergence and enables smarter, faster, cost-effective and flexible communication. Motorola had sales of U.S. $35.3 billion in 2005.

Today, Motorola is comprised of three businesses: Connected Home Solutions; Mobile Devices; and Networks & Enterprise.

Connected Home Solutions provides a scalable, integrated end-to-end system for the delivery of broadband services that keeps consumers informed, entertained and connected. Its technology enables network operators and retailers to create and execute on new business opportunities by providing innovative products and services to the home.

Mobile Devices offers market-changing icons of personal technology—transforming the device formerly known as the cell phone into a universal remote control for life. A leader in multi-mode, multi-band communications products and technologies, Mobile Devices designs, manufactures, sells and services wireless subscriber and server equipment for cellular systems, portable energy storage products and systems, servers and software solutions and related software and accessory products.

Networks & Enterprise is a leading provider of end-to-end infrastructure, integrated voice and data communications, and information solutions. Networks & Enterprise delivers mission-critical secure two-way radio, cellular and wireless broadband systems to meet the needs of public safety, government, private, service provider and enterprise customers worldwide.

To learn more about Motorola, visit www.motorola.com.
Appendix 1.

Critical Issues in Policing Series: Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response
Washington, D.C. • March 31, 2006

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Metropolitan Police Service, London

Sergeant John Ingoldsby
New York Police Department

Clifford Karchmer
Director of Federal Programs Center for Technology Commercialization

Inspector Matthew Klein
Director of Internal Affairs Division D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Sergeant Apollo Kowalyk
Edmonton Police Service Police Executive Research Forum Fellow
Appendix 1. Participant List from the Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response Conference

Commander Cathy Lanier  
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Commander Mickey Levy  
Israel Police Department

Deputy Chief Sharon Lubinski  
Minneapolis Police Department

Andrea Luna  
Senior Associate Police Executive Research Forum

Chet Lunner  
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Superintendent Neville Matthews  
New Zealand Embassy

Lieutenant Mike McCrimmon  
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Lieutenant Tom Monahan  
Las Vegas Metro Police Department

Emeka Moneme  
Chief of Staff Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Major Larry Moser  
Fairfax County Police Department

Jerry Murphy  
Director, Homeland Security and Program Development Police Executive Research Forum

Officer Marcos Perez  
Miami Police Department

Brigadier General Simon Perry  
Israel Police Department

Captain Charles Roper  
Los Angeles Police Department

Thomas Ryan  
D.C. Emergency Management Agency

Michael Seelman  
Management and Program Analyst FBI

Commander David Sobczyk  
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Michael Stenger  
U.S. Secret Service

Captain Kathy Suey  
Las Vegas Police Department

Chuck Wexler  
Executive Director Police Executive Research Forum

Lieutenant Andrew White  
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department
A P P E N D I X 2

Critical Issues in Policing Series:
Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response
Washington, D.C. • March 31, 2006

AGENDA

Friday March 31, 2006

9:00 AM – 10:00 AM
Welcome & Introductions
Chuck Wexler, Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum

10:00 AM – 10:30 AM
U.K. Police Preparedness and Response
Stephen House, Assistant Commissioner of Operations, London Metropolitan Police Service

10:45 AM – 11:30 AM
Israel Police Force: Lessons Learned
Brigadier General Simon Perry, Israel Police

11:30 AM – 12:15 PM
Lessons from Iraq
Michael Heidingsfield, President and CEO, Memphis Shelby Crime Commission

1:00 PM – 1:30 PM
Facilitated Group Discussion: U.S. Federal Law Enforcement and Security Preparedness Response
Michael Stenger, Assistant Director Protective Research, U.S. Secret Service
Joseph Billy, Deputy Assistant Director Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Michael Bouchard, Assistant Director Field Operations, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

1:30 PM – 3:30 PM
Facilitated Group Discussion: Critical Issues for Major U.S. Cities—Local Law Enforcement Preparedness

3:30 PM – 4:30 PM
Where Do We Go From Here?
APPENDIX 3

Critical Issues in Policing Series: Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit
Baltimore, MD  ■  January 17 – 18, 2007

PARTICIPANTS

Eric Albertsen
Project Assistant
Police Executive Research Forum

Kristopher Baumann
Chairman
Fraternal Order of Police, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

David Bilson
Chief Superintendent Metropolitan Police Service, London

Michael Bouchard
Assistant Director
ATF, Field Operations

Major Sean Breslin
U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Office

Major Jeff Caslin
Baltimore County Police Department

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U.S. Secret Service, Uniformed Division

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Police Executive Research Forum

Captain Mike Crosbie
Prince William County Police Department

Lieutenant Richard Cundiff
Prince William County Police Department

Sergeant Dennis Dudley
Frederick Police Department

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Director, Center on Force and Accountability Police Executive Research Forum

Errol Etting
Director of Intelligence Maryland Transportation Authority Police Department

Captain Horace Frank
Los Angeles Police Department

Captain Gregory Fremin
Houston Police Department

Lieutenant Kevin Gaddis
Metro Transit Police Department

Captain Steven Gallagher
Norfolk Police Department

Major Dale Greene
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department

Michael Heidingsfield
President and CEO Memphis Shelby Crime Commission

Captain Jeffrey Herold
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Steven Izzett
Staff Inspector Toronto Police Department

Lieutenant Randy Jones
Anne Arundel County Police Department

Matthew Klein
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Neville Matthews
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New Zealand Embassy

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U.S. Department of Justice

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Acting Deputy Chief
Anne Arundel County Police Department

Jim Pryor
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Seattle Police Department

Lisa Quinn
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U.S. Secret Service

Chief Joseph Riehl
ATF, Arson & Explosives Programs Division

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Boston University Police Department

Amy Schapiro
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COPS Office
U.S. Department of Justice

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Drew Tracy
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Montgomery County Police Department

Donald Van Duyn
Deputy Assistant Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Unit

Dee Walker
Assistant Chief
Montgomery County Police Department

Chuck Wexler
Executive Director
Police Executive Research Forum

Lieutenant Andrew White
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Col. Scott Williams
Baltimore City Police Department

Special Agent Charles Wood
U.S. Capitol Police Department, Bomb Squad
Appendix 4

Critical Issues in Policing Series: Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit

Baltimore, MD ■ January 17–18, 2007

AGENDA

Wednesday, January 17, 2007

8:30 AM – 8:45 AM
Welcome & Introductions
Joshua Ederheimer, Director, PERF Center on Force & Accountability
Chuck Wexler, Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum
Dave Pressley, Acting Deputy Chief, Anne Arundel County Police Department

8:45 AM – 9:45 AM
International Perspective
David Bilson, Chief Superintendent, Metropolitan Police Service, London
Michael Heidingsfield, President and CEO, Memphis Shelby Crime Commission (Iraq Police Advisor)

9:45 AM – 10:30 AM
Chiefs Perspective
Chief John Timoney, Miami Police Department
Chief Thomas Robbins, Boston University Police

10:45 AM – 11:30 AM
Local Perspective
Ralph Morten, Detective Supervisor, Los Angeles Police Department
Jeffrey Herold, Captain, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

11:30 AM – 12:15 PM
Federal Perspective
Michael Bouchard, Assistant Director of Field Operations, ATF
Donald Van Duyn, Assistant Director of Counter Terrorism, FBI
Robert Novy, Assistant to SAC, U.S. Secret Service

1:15 PM – 4:30 PM
Review Guidelines for Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat
Thursday, January 18, 2007

8:30 AM – 8:45 AM
Review of Progress

8:45 AM – 12:30 PM
Review Guidelines for Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat (continued)

12:30 PM – 12:45 PM
Closing Remarks and Adjourn
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT
Experts agree that police in the United States need to prepare for a suicide bomber attack. More specifically, we need to prepare for our response to the threat of a suicide bomber. How will dispatchers handle the calls of a detected or perceived threat? How will first responders handle the suspected bomber and civilians that may be nearby? Once a threat is confirmed and in preparation of a detonation, what do we expect will happen and how will law enforcement respond? These split second decisions will most likely need to be made by patrol officers who will arrive on the scene first.

Law enforcement can begin preparing a response to the threat of a suicide bomber by conducting immediate and comprehensive reviews of current policies and developing training for all officers. We can better prepare all officers to respond to suicide bomb threats with greater confidence in: (1) what decisions need to be made, (2) a firm understanding of how to assess the situation and make those decisions, and (3) tactical solutions for handling the situation, considering the multiple variables that may exist.

In March PERF held a one-day forum in Washington, D.C. in which participants began to discuss the multitude of issues surrounding policy and tactical decisions that may be necessary in addressing this threat. Two specific issues emerged: (1) departments seem reluctant to talk about suicide bombing and (2) there is a debate on whether it is necessary to have specific policies regarding tactics and training related to suicide bombing or if these are incorporated (or should be) into existing use of force policies.

TASKING
PERF plans to conduct a number of site visits over the next six months to learn more about what departments (nationally and internationally) are doing to prepare patrol for the imminent threats of suicide bombers.

SITE VISIT GUIDE

General Language — Do you use language such as suicide bomber in policies and training? Do you use other language, i.e., suicide terrorist? Define the language you use. For instance, would the 9/11 hijackers be called suicide bombers in your vocabulary? If not, what would they be called? (Make sure you understand the language they are using. Working definitions can be misunderstood or assumed incorrectly.)

Scenario — A call comes in saying a suspicious person is in the city center yelling religious ideologies and wearing a large backpack. What happens? How does the call get labeled and where does it go? Who responds (if anyone)? Now, the suspicious person appears to be holding an object that is
connected underneath their clothing and their behavior continues to be erratic. They do not respond to the police verbal commands. What does the responding officer do?

What are specific tactics that patrol are taught to address threats of suicide bombers?

*Historical Perspective* — Identify the evolution of related incidents in their jurisdiction (as well as nationally recognized incidents—such as 9/11) and overlay that information with the evolution of their bomb oriented and counter-terrorism squads and/or protocols to address such threats (and related threats). When did they begin to start talking about suicide bomber threats? What actionable items resulted from those talks and when? Do you have an active shooter protocol? What is currently on the table related to suicide bomber threats (discussions, disagreements, tactics, training, etc...)? Do you have an active shooter protocol? What is currently on the table related to suicide bomber threats (discussions, disagreements, tactics, training, etc...)? Do you have an active shooter protocol? What is currently on the table related to suicide bomber threats (discussions, disagreements, tactics, training, etc...)? Do you have an active shooter protocol? What is currently on the table related to suicide bomber threats (discussions, disagreements, tactics, training, etc...)?

*Speaking to the front line* — It is essential that you talk with patrol officers to gauge their understanding of what to do if they get a call or observe behavior that could be a suicide bomber. What would they do? Have they been given guidance? What sort of guidance have they been given and by whom? What guidance would they like? (It may help to deliver a scenario to get a more contextually rich answer. If so, document the scenario or use the above noted scenario.)

*Bomb Squads* — Quick overview of the squad and their work. Date of squad inception and significant changes to squad, protocol, etc... How quickly does the bomb squad assemble in a targeted place? What working relationship does the bomb squad have with patrol? Is it assumed that the bomb squad would handle a call about a suspicious person who could be a suicide bomber? If this has happened, get the details of how it was processed. What other agencies/departments does the bomb squad work with to prepare for suicide bombers? Why? How often? In what capacity?

*Counter-terrorism Units* — Same questions as above for Bomb Squad.

*SOPS & Policies* — The following areas should be examined for guidance on policy recommendations and tactical decisions:

- Current use of force policies, procedures and training (including active shooter protocols);
- Bomb squad protocols and training; and
- Suicide bombing-specific policies, training and protocols (if they exist).

(In all of these items—How do they relate to or guide *patrol* response? Remember that an absence of something is a finding.)
## APPENDIX 6
U.S. Department of the Army, National Ground Intelligence Center, Intelligence and Security Command, 
Estimates of Dangers Posed by Various Types of Explosives

### UNCLASSIFIED

**Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Description</th>
<th>Explosives Mass (TNT equivalent)</th>
<th>Building Evacuation Distance</th>
<th>Outdoor Evacuation Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pipe Bomb</td>
<td>5 lbs 2.3 kg</td>
<td>70 ft 21 m</td>
<td>850 ft 259 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Belt</td>
<td>10 lbs 4.5 kg</td>
<td>90 ft 27 m</td>
<td>1,080 ft 330 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Vest</td>
<td>20 lbs 9 kg</td>
<td>110 ft 34 m</td>
<td>1,360 ft 415 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefcase/Suitcase Bomb</td>
<td>50 lbs 23 kg</td>
<td>150 ft 46 m</td>
<td>1,850 ft 564 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compact Sedan</td>
<td>500 lbs 227 kg</td>
<td>320 ft 98 m</td>
<td>1,500 ft 457 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedan</td>
<td>1,000 lbs 454 kg</td>
<td>400 ft 122 m</td>
<td>1,750 ft 534 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger/Cargo Van</td>
<td>4,000 lbs 1,814 kg</td>
<td>640 ft 196 m</td>
<td>2,750 ft 838 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Moving Van/Delivery Truck</td>
<td>10,000 lbs 4,538 kg</td>
<td>860 ft 263 m</td>
<td>3,750 ft 1,143 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving Van/Water Truck</td>
<td>30,000 lbs 13,608 kg</td>
<td>1,240 ft 375 m</td>
<td>6,500 ft 1,982 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semitrailer</td>
<td>60,000 lbs 27,216 kg</td>
<td>1,570 ft 476 m</td>
<td>7,000 ft 2,134 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### High Explosives (TNT Equivalent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Description</th>
<th>LPG Mass/Volume</th>
<th>Fireball Diameter</th>
<th>Safe Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small LPG Tank</td>
<td>20 lbs/6 gal 9 kg/19 l</td>
<td>40 ft 12 m</td>
<td>160 ft 48 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large LPG Tank</td>
<td>100 lbs/25 gal 45 kg/95 l</td>
<td>69 ft 21 m</td>
<td>276 ft 84 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial/Residential LPG Tank</td>
<td>2,000 lbs/500 gal 907 kg/1,893 l</td>
<td>184 ft 56 m</td>
<td>736 ft 224 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small LPG Truck</td>
<td>8,000 lbs/2,000 gal 3,630 kg/7,570 l</td>
<td>292 ft 89 m</td>
<td>1,168 ft 356 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semitenker LPG</td>
<td>40,000 lbs/10,000 gal 18,144 kg/37,850 l</td>
<td>499 ft 152 m</td>
<td>1,996 ft 608 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Based on the maximum amount of material that could reasonably fit into a container or vehicle. Variations possible.
2 Governed by the ability of an unreinforced building to withstand severe damage or collapse.
3 Governed by the greater of fragment throw distance or glass breakage/felling glass hazard distance. These distances can be reduced for personnel wearing ballistic protection. Note that the pipe bomb, suicide belt/vest, and briefcase/suitcase bomb are assumed to have a fragmentation characteristic that requires greater standoff distances than an equal amount of explosives in a vehicle.
4 Assuming efficient mixing of the flammable gas with ambient air.
5 Determined by U.S. firefighting practices wherein safe distances are approximately 4 times the flame height. Note that an LPG tank filled with high explosives would require a significantly greater standoff distance than if it were filled with LPG.
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