



**ICAT**

**Integrating  
Communications,  
Assessment,  
and Tactics™**

*Developed by the Police Executive Research Forum*



**June 2021**

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
# ICAT Module #1: Introduction

## Module #1: Introduction

### About ICAT (12 slides)

#### About ICAT

- Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics (ICAT):  
What It Is
  - ICAT is a training program that provides first-responding police officers with tools, skills, and options for successfully and safely defusing a wide range of critical incidents.
  - ICAT takes the essential building blocks of critical thinking, crisis intervention, communications, and tactics, and puts them together in an integrated approach to training.
- ICAT Was Created by PERF with Input from Working Cops
  - ICAT was created by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), a research organization in Washington, DC whose members include police chiefs, sheriffs, and other local, state, and federal law enforcement officials. Since its founding in 1976, PERF has emerged as a leader in identifying best practices on critical issues in policing, including:
    - Police use of force;
    - New technologies in policing, such as facial recognition, drones, and body-worn cameras;
    - Officer safety and wellness;
    - Strategies for reducing crime.
- The Origins of ICAT, and How It Was Created
  - ICAT goes back to a spate of controversial uses of force by police agencies across the United States in 2014. At a September 2014 national conference of police chiefs hosted by PERF, it became clear that the controversial incidents that disturb the public are *not* the ones in which police confront a suspect armed with a firearm, committing a serious violent crime.
  - Rather, the incidents that bother community members typically involve a person with a mental illness or other condition that causes them to behave erratically. Often, the



## ICAT Module #1: Introduction

people in these incidents either are unarmed, or they are holding a knife, or a rock, or some other weapon, but not a gun. According to the Washington Post's database of 6,329 fatal officer-involved shootings since 2015, in 59% of the incidents, the subjects had firearms, but in 39% of the cases, the subject either was unarmed or was armed with a knife or other weapon, but not a firearm.

- Lessons from Abroad
  - In 2015, PERF Executive Director Chuck Wexler was in Scotland with several American police chiefs for a leadership development program, and decided to attend a recruit graduation. Knowing that only about 2 percent of police officers in Scotland carry firearms, Wexler asked a Scottish officer, “How do you deal with people brandishing knives, when you don’t have a firearm?”
  - The Scottish officer said, “It’s no problem. We stand back, we assess the situation.” He proceeded to describe Police Scotland’s approach to critical thinking, de-escalation, and tactics for resolving these incidents.
  - The American police chiefs were shocked when Scottish police officials explained that they receive 1.8 million emergency calls per year, including thousands of incidents involving persons with knives, *but most years go by without the police in Scotland shooting a single person.*
  - So in November 2015, at PERF’s request, Police Scotland hosted a delegation of police chiefs and other high-ranking officials from nearly 25 American police agencies, for four days of training demonstrations, presentations, and candid discussions about Scotland’s strategies for resolving incidents.
  - The strategies for officers include keeping their distance, maintaining cover, and using a calm tone of voice to slow the situation down. With additional time, police can ask the person questions, develop a dialogue, build trust, and convince the person to put the knife or other weapon down and submit to police authority voluntarily.


## ICAT Module #1: Introduction

- Similarity to SWAT Units in American Agencies
  - Importantly, American police chiefs realized that their SWAT units were already doing what the Scottish patrol officers were doing with de-escalation of incidents that do not involve firearms.
  - So in December 2015, PERF asked the New York City Police Department's SWAT unit, called the Emergency Service Unit (ESU), for a demonstration of how they train and operate in responding to incidents involving mental illness and knives. The ESU is one of the most highly respected police units in the United States. On September 11, 2001, the ESU lost 14 of its members who responded to the World Trade Center attacks.
  - Perhaps the most important insight was that the NYPD's ESU response is very similar to what PERF saw in Scotland.
  - Meanwhile, PERF was hosting a series of national and regional conferences in the United States in which hundreds of police chiefs, along with mental health officials and other experts, developed strategies for resolving critical incidents without use of lethal force. These meetings included a national conference in May 2015, a second national conference in January 2016, and other conferences, as detailed in a series of PERF reports:
    - [Re-Engineering Training on Police Use of Force](#)
    - [Guiding Principles on Use of Force](#)
    - [ICAT: Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics](#)

# ICAT Module #1: Introduction

## About ICAT (II)

- Pilot Testing of ICAT
  - PERF obtained the assistance of seven jurisdictions for “pilot-testing” of the first iteration of ICAT, including the police departments in Houston, TX; Daytona Beach, FL; Baltimore, MD; Camden County, NJ; Burlington, VT; Prince William County, VA; and the Bay Area Rapid Transit Police Department. PERF obtained feedback about the training from police officers and instructors in these departments, and that feedback is reflected in ICAT.
- Updates and Additions to ICAT
  - In 2019, PERF added a new module to the original ICAT, to provide guidance about a particular type of incident that occurs more often than most people realize: suicide by cop. In these incidents, a suicidal person intentionally brandishes a weapon at a police officer, in an attempt to force the officer to use lethal force.
    - [Suicide by Cop: Protocol and Training Guide](#)
  - Since the release of ICAT in 2016, more than 600 law enforcement agencies have received various forms of training on it. PERF has directly participated in the training of ICAT in many agencies. This new and updated ICAT Training Guide reflects feedback we have obtained from many departments over the last five years.



## About ICAT (III)

## About ICAT (IV)



# ICAT Module #1: Introduction

## This Training Is About Creating More Options

- Emphasize the point that ICAT was made “by cops for cops!”
- John Flynn helped develop the ICAT program. He is an experienced Sgt. with NYPD’s Emergency Services Unit (ESU).
  - ESU has approx. 400 officers that handle some of NYPD’s most difficult jobs (SWAT, bridge and building rescues, etc.)
  - ESU handles thousands of calls for service annually.
  - Many involve individuals experiencing mental and/or situational crisis.



## 📺 Sheriff Jim Hart: The Impact of ICAT

- 📺 Video length: 1:23.
- Jim Hart is the Sheriff of Santa Cruz County, CA.
  - Trained his entire agency in ICAT after a 2016 incident where local officers fatally shot a person in mental crisis armed with a rake.
  - ICAT training had a positive impact on his agency.
  - *Note: When teaching your own agency, have your chief/sheriff deliver this message instead of this video.*



## LEAs Using ICAT

- More than 600 law enforcement agencies have received ICAT training. This slide shows some of those agencies.
  - Several agencies such as Baltimore (MD) PD, Camden County (NJ) PD, Santa Cruz County (CA) SO, Monterey (CA) PD, and Louisville Metro (KY) PD have fully integrated ICAT into their trainings and policies.
  - Note the diverse states, sizes of agencies, types (e.g. universities, city, county agencies).



## ICAT's Focus

- Key point: We are talking about non-firearm incidents. ICAT concentrates on subjects who are:
  - Experiencing mental and/or situational crisis
  - Unarmed, or;
  - Armed with a weapon *other than a firearm* (e.g. a knife, bat, stick, etc.)






# ICAT Module #1: Introduction

## ICAT's Focus (II)

- Approximately 60% of fatal officer involved shootings (OIS) in the US involve subjects armed with firearms.<sup>1,2</sup>
- ICAT is designed to produce better outcomes in the 40% of fatal OIS that involve subjects who are unarmed or armed with something other than a firearm.
- ICAT also promotes effective communication to reduce all uses of force or physical confrontation.



## ICAT Research

- A rigorous study involving hundreds of officers from the Louisville (KY) Metropolitan Police Department showed that ICAT resulted in dramatic reductions in use of force incidents, citizen injuries, and officer injuries.<sup>3</sup>




## ICAT Research (II)

- Study results indicate that ICAT led to changes in officer behavior associated with and surrounding the use of force (e.g. injuries to officers and suspects). According to lead researcher Dr. Robin Engel, this is the first study of a police de-escalation training program to show changes in both officer attitudes and behavior.



## ICAT Research (III)

- The study found that “the research team is confident that the changes in uses of force – and the subsequent reductions in citizen and officer injuries – correspond with the timing of the [ICAT] training across the various police divisions.”<sup>4</sup>
  - The researchers also note that the results were “beyond chance.”



<sup>1</sup> <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/>

<sup>2</sup> Note that these numbers are for *fatal* officer-involved *shootings*. There is no reliable data PERF is aware of which includes non-fatal shootings and other forms of deadly force.

<sup>3</sup> [\*Examining the Impact of Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics \(ICAT\) De-escalation Training for the Louisville Metro Police Department: Initial Findings\*](#) by Engel, Corsaro, Isaza, and McManus (2020).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.


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**Note: The role of the First Line Supervisor (FLS) is critical, creating an environment that not only supports ICAT but allows the training to be engrained in the culture of their squads, units, and the overall agency. The FLS must embrace the concept of slowing incidents down, encouraging subordinates to utilize the Critical Decision-Making Model (CDM) and understanding that the “culture of speed” works against them in being successful when engaging those in crisis and persons with chronic mental illnesses.**

## Tying it Together (7 slides)

### 📁 Case Study (Baltimore, MD)

Baltimore Police are called to residence for a medical call. When the officer arrives on scene, he is met by EMS and informed a woman inside the residence is armed with a knife.



- Note: There are other officers in the residence with the primary officer (Robert). One officer is providing less-lethal coverage (Taser), and another is providing lethal coverage (firearm).
- On a few occasions, Robert moves towards the subject (Penny) and is pulled or told to move back by his cover officers to maintain a sufficient reactionary gap should the situation change.
- 📁 Play Video - length: 10:55.
  - *Note: Although this video is nearly eleven minutes long, it is important for the instructor to visibly monitor the class. As time goes on, you will likely see telltale signs of officers being impacted by the “culture of speed” mentality. This is an opportunity to discuss with the class the pitfall of getting caught in the culture of speed that has traditionally been taught in the profession.*
- Discussion points/Questions to ask:
  - Every officer has their own “reactionary gap” where they feel comfortable dealing with a subject based upon their own personal skills and abilities. Would your reactionary gap with Penny have been different than Robert’s? Why or why not?
  - How do you think Robert performed overall?
  - Is the knife a threat to the officers? *Answer: Yes*
  - Is Penny a threat to the officers? *Answer: Possibly*


## ICAT Module #1: Introduction

- Is Penny an immediate threat or threatening to the officers?  
*Answer: No*
- If we replaced Penny with a physically fit, 20-year-old, Division I college athlete, would that change our reactionary gap and tactics? *Answer: Yes*
- Could the officers have used the Taser to subdue Penny?
  - Although justified, what could happen if it missed or failed to be effective?
  - Might that have changed the dynamics of the encounter, possibly resulting in Penny suddenly charging the officers?
- In general, could officers potentially avoid injuring or killing someone by slowing down their response (like Robert did), using distance, cover, and time to produce a better outcome for everyone involved?

Note: This video, along with the St. Louis Video Case Study covered later in this module, provides a solid base to refer to throughout the training. Trainers can use them periodically throughout to illustrate the differences in the threat presented by Penny from Baltimore and the subject in St. Louis, as well as the different approaches taken by officers in the respective situations.

### Consider


- These encounters are not easy. They present many issues and challenges.
- So, what can we do to keep everyone *safe*?



# ICAT Module #1: Introduction

## Challenging Conventional Thinking

- “We already do this stuff.”
  - Many agencies teach some components or principles of ICAT. However, most teach the components separately (in silos) but not together in a comprehensive, *integrated* program. Agencies often see similarities to Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training, which is true. However, ICAT is centered on the Critical Decision-Making Model, and using sound decision making to guide you through your response. In addition, CIT does not focus on tactics. As is discussed later in the program, if the officer doesn’t feel safe they may not work through the best response. Sound tactics make the officer safer, allow better decisions and hopefully better outcomes.
- Do we need use-of-force continuums?
  - Continuums don’t truly represent the critical decision-making process officers use to navigate incidents.
  - The force should always be proportionate to the specific situation. Proportionality will be discussed in more detail in the next module.
- “21-foot rule” vs. reactionary gap.
  - Move away from teaching the “21-foot rule” as an automatic trigger for lethal force. It was never intended for that purpose. (*This will be addressed further in Module 5*).
  - Instead, use a “reactionary gap” as a guide and consider what space is needed based upon your own skills, abilities, and available resources.
  - Let the gap fluctuate to correspond with the threat and keep more options available.
- “We don’t have all day.”
  - It is important that we break the “culture of speed” in our profession. If time is available, why do we rush?
  - In most situations, time is on our side. Use it to get additional resources or assets to the scene.



## ICAT Module #1: Introduction

- Retreating vs. tactical repositioning.
  - Call it whatever makes the officers feel better, but in the end, if you need to move back to cover, gain better sight lines, or keep yourself in a winnable position, then it's the right thing to do.
  - If the situation allows you to move, yet still contain the subject or threat, is it better to do so instead of "standing your ground" and forcing a confrontation.
  - The best SWAT and tactical teams in the world do it, so it only makes sense that patrol officers can too.
- Not having a Plan B.
  - If Plan A fails, then what? If your Taser is ineffective, what are you going to do?
  - Officers need to have a Plan B so that they are not left in a vulnerable position.
  - For officers to remain in a winnable situation if their initial plan fails, it's important to utilize critical thinking and know that it is okay to reposition, restart, and rethink. For example, an officer may feel it's best to back out of a room, house, or building and re-work through the CDM to consider other options.
- Drawing a line in the sand.
  - When a subject poses an immediate threat to officers or others, police must often make tough decisions.
  - However, if that threat can be reduced or eliminated by the officers on scene, or simply has not materialized yet, then can we be flexible?
- Not taking action is a "failure to act."
  - If the subject has committed no crime and is only a harm to themselves, what is the need to force a resolution?
  - For example: Why rush to enter a room when we can talk from the doorway?
- "I go home safely vs. we all go home safely."
  - There is intrinsic value in trying to preserve all human life. It is better for the general public and the overall wellness of officers.
- Winning at all costs?

# ICAT Module #1: Introduction

## This Training Covers

- Critical Decision-Making.
  - How do officers think when faced with crisis situations?
  - **Module 2** covers decision making and the Critical Decision-Making Model (CDM), a tool to help you critically think your way through an incident from start to finish.
- Crisis Recognition.
  - How do I recognize a subject that may be experiencing a mental and/or situational crisis?
  - **Module 3** covers crisis recognition to help you identify some of the common behaviors of a person in crisis.
- Tactical Communications.
  - How do I communicate with a subject in crisis?
  - **Module 4** provides strategies for communicating tactically, to help you successfully respond and communicate to a person in crisis.
- Suicide by Cop.
  - How do I determine if a person is trying to force me to kill them?
  - **Module 5** explores “suicide-by-cop” situations, including indicators, warning signs, and prevention. As discussed in the previous two modules, recognition and communication are at the forefront of the Suicide by Cop module.
- Operational Tactics.
  - What actions should I take to keep everyone safe?
  - **Module 6** covers tactics to keep you safe as you work to prevent a critical incident from escalating to the point of deadly force.
- “Step Up and Step In.”
  - To put the lessons of the first six modules into practice, officers need to Step Up and Step In. Officers “step up” by taking ownership of challenging situations, using the Critical Decision-Making Model to lead the situation to the best possible outcome. And officers “step in” by speaking up and acting when they see a situation going poorly. This might involve intervening when they see a colleague is about to make a mistake, or speaking up if they think they




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have a plan that is more likely to safely resolve a situation. *Step Up and Step In* is about preventing problems before they occur.

- Scenario-based Training.
  - ICAT uses live scenarios to integrate all of the learned skills, and emphasizes the importance of using strategies, tactics, communications, and critical thinking together.
  - It also prepares officers for real world encounters by stressing the concepts of teamwork, contact and cover, and the individual's reactionary gap.

## This Training Is *Not*:

- Telling officers to walk away from or ignore danger.
- Putting officers in an unwinnable situation. Just the opposite: ICAT focuses on putting and keeping officers in a *winnable* situation.
- Telling officers they can't use force – including lethal force – when appropriate.
- Limiting options for officers (*ICAT is actually about increasing options, which enhances safety*).



## Focus

- Patrol officer response.
  - Patrol is typically the first on the scene.
    - SWAT and other specialized units usually are not first to arrive. That is why much of ICAT is about teaching patrol officers tactics and techniques used by tactical teams).
  - The first few minutes of an encounter are often crucial to a safe resolution.
  - Goal may be to *stabilize* the situation – not necessarily resolving it right away.
  - A key strategy is “buying time,” so supervisors, additional resources, or specialized units can respond.
  - Supervisors: Need to give officers time to work these situations – not every incident can be handled quickly.
    - Ask any supervisors in the room if they would rather have their officers spend extra time ensuring a positive outcome, or if they would prefer to be tasked with managing a use of force or OIS.



## ICAT Module #1: Introduction


- Non-firearm incidents.
  - In approximately 40% of the fatal officer-involved shooting incidents since 2015, the subject did not have a firearm. Many of these encounters are dangerous, and ICAT does not minimize that. But the threat is different than situations in which the subject is armed with a firearm.
  - Some can be safely resolved without the use of deadly force. That is the focus of this training!
- Integrating Communications And Tactics.
  - Taking key skills from each discipline, and *combining* them as part of an overall response strategy.
  - Influence behavioral change to gain voluntary compliance (when possible). Officers need a wide range of skills to stabilize scenes that are often chaotic.
  - Training to communicate effectively under stress. ICAT presents practical alternatives to approaches that often do not work, such as drawing a service weapon and repeatedly issuing verbal commands such as “Drop the knife!”
- Officer safety and wellness.
  - Keeping officers out of harm’s way (physically) by providing more options.
  - Protecting officers from the emotional trauma, public scrutiny, and legal troubles that often follow an officer-involved shooting.
  - ICAT was made with the input of officers, supervisors and police executives from agencies across the country. They would not put their names to anything that would endanger officers, and neither would PERF.



# ICAT Module #1: Introduction

## Implementation

- Consider training telecommunicators (call-takers and dispatchers) along with officers.
  - Telecommunicators are often the first to receive and disseminate information.
  - Knowing what type of information is useful to officers or why officers may ask for certain information can be critical for responding telecommunicators.
- Careful consideration needs to be given to the selection of ICAT trainers and role-players for scenario-based training sessions.
  - ICAT trainers and role players should be willing to immerse themselves in the ICAT principles and recognize the importance of high-quality, scenario-based training.
  - An example is the Camden County (New Jersey) Police Department, which didn't limit itself to academy staff when searching for the right individuals to deliver the ICAT message and carry out the mission to educate the entire department.
- Focus on improving responses, not dwelling on “what went wrong.”
  - Look to address “missed opportunities” instead of criticizing the actions of others.
- This is all about creating *more* options for officers, *not* limiting them!



# ICAT Module #1: Introduction

## Video Case Study (2 slides)

### 📺 Case Study (St. Louis, MO)

Key Point: ICAT training utilizes videos to illustrate the principles of the program and to prompt discussions. Some of the videos are used to exemplify certain components of ICAT, while others are used as learning tools to identify possible “missed opportunities” that may have changed the overall dynamic of a situation.



It is critical to clarify to students that ICAT trainers are not passing judgment on the officers in these videos. In many of the videos where officers shoot the subject, we understand that the officer’s actions are legally justified under *Graham v. Connor*’s objective reasonableness standard. We are simply looking for students to identify what worked or did not work for officers, and to identify potential “missed opportunities.”

If students believe you are guilty of “Monday morning quarterbacking” the officers in these videos, politely tell them: **“All good teams, in every sport, look at game film to get better. We are no different. We need to look at game film to see how our skills can improve and we can get better.”**

- Ten days after the fatal shooting of Michael Brown in nearby Ferguson, MO, a man in St. Louis enters a local convenience store, takes two sodas and a donut, and leaves without paying for the items. Once outside, he puts the sodas on the ground and begins to pace back and forth on the sidewalk directly in front of the store. The store owner is the first to call 911 to report the incident.<sup>5</sup>
- ❖ Play 1<sup>st</sup> 911 call - length: 0:45.
  - Discussion points/questions to ask:
    - What did the store owner report?
    - Is it normal for a person to remain in front of a store they shoplifted from?
    - What additional questions could have been asked by the call-taker? Or was the info good enough?
    - What additional info might you want before arriving?

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<sup>5</sup> [St. Louis Circuit Attorney’s Office Report Regarding the Review into the Shooting Death of Kajieme Powell](#) (2015).

## ICAT Module #1: Introduction

- ◀ Play 1<sup>st</sup> dispatch - length: 0:34
  - Discussion points/questions to ask:
    - What additional information was asked for by the responding officers?
    - At this point, is there an immediate need for more information?
      - *(Note: There are no correct or incorrect answers to this question. Many officers will view this as a routine call and will not be concerned about getting additional information at this time.)*
  - The 2<sup>nd</sup> caller is a person inside the business next door. The volume on this call starts low but quickly increases.
- ◀ Play 2<sup>nd</sup> 911 call - length: 1:13.
  - Discussion points/questions to ask:
    - Immediately point out that the call-taker hung up on the caller!
    - How good of a witness was this caller?
      - Witness was safely locked inside the business.
      - Could see everything going on outside.
      - Provided incredibly detailed descriptions of the subject and his actions.
    - What additional questions could have been asked by dispatch?
      - How big is the knife?
      - Where is the knife now?
      - Is he threatening anyone with it?
      - What is the subject doing right now?
    - Should the call-taker have kept the caller on the phone? How might that be helpful?
- ◀ Play 2<sup>nd</sup> dispatch - length: 0:29
  - Discussion points/questions to ask:
    - What additional information did the officers request?
    - Was there any additional information available?
    - Is it typical to receive multiple calls for service for a misdemeanor larceny call?

## ICAT Module #1: Introduction

- Could the call-taker have attempted to clarify the number of knives possessed by the subject?
- Would you want any clarification about the knife or knives? Is someone armed with two knives possibly more goal-oriented than a person who possesses one knife?

Note: The video was recorded by a bystander. Before playing the video, ask the class to listen to what the person filming says at the very beginning of the video clip as he is walking towards the subject. He says: “My homeboy came and got me.” Later, they will hear the store owner say to the subject, “This is not how you do it.” It appears that many people witnessing this are anticipating a confrontation with police outside the store.


📺 Video - length: 1:39

- This video ends before the situation is resolved. *(The subject will be shot by police. The end of the video is shown in Module 6.)*
- Discussion points - *As stated earlier, the remaining portion of this video will be shown in Module 6.*
  - Although the officers in this video did not do anything wrong, you may notice several missed opportunities that *may* have produced a different reaction from the subject upon arrival at the scene.
  - It now appears the situation is escalating to where the subject is trying to commit “suicide-by-cop” and the officers may have to use deadly force.
    - There is a very good possibility that even if the officers took advantage of the “missed opportunities” we identified, this subject may have acted in the exact same manner, ultimately resulting in a shooting. If a person is goal-oriented on committing “suicide-by-cop,” there may be little anyone can do to stop it. However, because these opportunities were missed, we will never know if the interaction might have evolved or ended differently.

# ICAT Module #1: Introduction

## Challenges

- Was there information that was not utilized?
- Did the available information indicate the subject wanted a confrontation with the police?
- Was the subject's behavior on arrival a concern for the officers?
- Were there safety concerns the officers needed to consider for themselves and the public?
- Missed opportunities:
  - Could the officers have slowed their vehicle down when they arrived, in order to give themselves time to visually assess:
    - Where the subject is and what he's doing?
    - If anyone appears to be in harm's way?
    - If there are obstacles or safety concerns in case they needed to immediately respond to a threat (e.g. shoot)?
  - What message was being sent to the subject when the officers drove their vehicle onto the sidewalk? Did that place either of the officers at a tactical disadvantage?
    - *Note: Point out that pulling up on the sidewalk gave the officer on the passenger's side limited room, and thus limited options.*
  - Would they have been in a better position had they stopped their vehicle in the street? Could they have used their vehicle as cover and to create distance between the subject and themselves?
  - Was there any chance to engage the subject differently? For example: "What's going on?" instead of repeating "Drop the knife!"




# ICAT Module #1: Introduction

## Leadership Snapshot (2 slides)

### Leadership Snapshot

- Effective supervision begins long before officers encounter an individual experiencing a mental or situational crisis.
  - Recognize that these situations are challenging even for experienced officers, and you are there to help your officers achieve a successful outcome.
- Supervisors need to become involved in crisis incidents from the point of initial dispatch.
  - Notify dispatch and responding personnel that you received the information and will be monitoring for updates as you respond.
  - Prior to your arrival, use your radio to direct the initial officer response and/or all responding resources.
  - Ensure that officers and dispatchers understand your agency's expectations for these situations, and that they share appropriate information:
    - Initial notification to supervisor (either by dispatch or the officers)
    - Updates
    - Actions taken/Actions being considered
      - *Note: Many agencies have policies and procedures for certain types of high-risk situations that require immediate supervisor notification (e.g. motor vehicle pursuits, domestic disturbances, etc.) Requiring supervisor notification for mental health crises should be a serious consideration.*
- Supervisors should be prepared to ask questions and assist responding officers in gathering available information.
  - If you have unanswered questions, or there is information missing or being ignored, ask for clarification, and make sure all responding officers acknowledge your directives.




## ICAT Module #1: Introduction

- Embrace the research.
  - ICAT can help change the culture of an agency.
    - In the recent study of how ICAT impacted the Louisville, KY Police Department, researchers found that ICAT led to changes in both officer attitudes and behaviors, which led to *significant reductions in use-of-force incidents, subject injuries, and officer injuries.*
  - Supervisors can influence culture and set the “tone” for how your personnel responds to these crisis incidents.
- Go to the scene and be visible! Do not assume your officers will not need you.
  - Unless absolutely necessary, do not attempt to supervise the entire incident over the radio. When officers know a supervisor is responding in person:
    - They are more likely to “slow the situation down.”
    - They are more likely to conduct themselves in a manner consistent with agency expectations.
  - If you are not able to respond or there is no supervisor available:
    - Look to utilize an on-scene officer as an “informal leader.”
    - Direct a trusted officer to respond and “assist” the other officers.

# ICAT Module #1: Introduction

## Leadership Snapshot (II)

- Get to know your personnel and understand your team dynamics in order to put officers in winnable situations based on their strengths and weaknesses.
  - How well do *you* know your team?
- An effective supervisor ensures that all personnel use sound tactics and good communication throughout an incident.
  - Be mindful that some, or all, of the responding officers may not have your level of experience in dealing with a particular situation. Ensure that your communications are calm, clear, and easy to understand. In high-stress situations, you should have officers repeat your instructions.
- If officers successfully defuse a challenging situation, celebrate that successful outcome!
  - Nominate officers for departmental awards.
    - Consider developing a Critical Incident Award.
  - Don't forget to recognize the dispatchers who also may have assisted in the successful outcome.
  - Provide a positive performance note in the officers' files.
  - Publicly praise the officers in front of peers and other supervisors.
- Consider: In the St. Louis video, if a supervisor had been dispatched after it was learned the subject was armed with a knife, how might they have altered the response? What things would you have done prior to arriving to keep those officers in a winnable position?



Note: It is critical for instructors to solicit students' thoughts, questions, and observations at the end of modules *and* when students *return* from breaks, because students often discuss issues and formulate questions during breaks.

