

SUBJECT TO DEBATE

A NEWSLETTER OF THE POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM



LOS ANGELES CAPTAIN JOHN MCMAHON:
We Need New Training on Use of Force
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More than 400 Police Officials Receive ICAT Training At National Conference in New Orleans

IN OCTOBER 2016, PERF RELEASED *ICAT: Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics*, a training guide for police departments that wish to re-engineer their training of officers in order to defuse critical incidents.

ICAT focuses on incidents in which police encounter persons with a mental illness or other condition that causes them to behave erratically. ICAT also focuses on incidents involving persons who either are unarmed or are armed with a knife, blunt instrument, or other weapon, but not a firearm. These types of incidents occur often in many jurisdictions, and sometimes end with controversial officer-involved shootings.

ICAT was based on work by hundreds of police officials of all ranks over a period of two years.¹ ICAT consists of a 61-page summary report, as well as more detailed training materials available on PERF's website at <http://www.policeforum.org/icat>. The materials include lesson plans, Powerpoints, video case studies, and other resources, arranged in six modules.

Shortly after releasing ICAT in October, PERF announced that it would hold a two-day national training conference for departments that wished to incorporate ICAT in their training programs. More than 400 police officials from 160 agencies participated in this conference, which was held on December 13-14 in New Orleans. The participants included members of

seven police departments that already had pilot-tested ICAT as it was being developed.

This issue of *Subject to Debate* provides highlights of the New Orleans meeting, in the words of participating police officials from across the country.

Many of the discussions were led by PERF Executive Director Chuck Wexler, PERF Director of Program Management Kevin Morison, and PERF Director of Applied Research Tom Wilson.

PERF is very grateful to the Motorola Solutions Foundation for providing support for the ICAT Training session in New Orleans.



PERF To Hold 2 More ICAT Meetings Soon, In Baltimore and Los Angeles

PERF is planning two additional ICAT training conferences, similar to the New Orleans meeting described in this issue of *Subject to Debate*.

On March 2, PERF will hold an ICAT training meeting in Baltimore, in conjunction with the Baltimore Police Department. And on April 26, PERF will hold a similar meeting in Los Angeles with the Los Angeles Police Department.

Details are being announced in emails to PERF members and posted on the PERF website at www.policeforum.org.

1. For details about how ICAT was developed, see the following PERF reports, available on PERF's website at <http://www.policeforum.org/free-online-documents>:

- *ICAT: Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics*
- *Guiding Principles on Use of Force*
- *Re-Engineering Training on Police Use of Force*
- *Defining Moments for Police Chiefs*

**CAMDEN COUNTY, NJ CHIEF
AND PERF PRESIDENT SCOTT THOMSON:**

**I Recruited the Natural Leaders in the Department
To Re-Engineer Our Use-of-Force Training**

Chuck Wexler: Scott, you run the police department in a city that has crime problems. It's not some bucolic suburb. How many guns do you take off the street?

Chief Thomson: We seize about 350 guns a year.

Wexler: Camden was one of the pilot sites for ICAT. Can you tell us how you approached implementing this new training on use of force?

Chief Thomson: The culture within many police departments is exemplified through clichés like “I’d rather be tried by 12 than carried by 6, my top job is to go home at the end of my shift, the 21-foot rule kill zone,” and so on. Thus cops become focused on justifying use of force, and sometimes lose sight of the foundation of our highest priority, which is the sanctity of human life.

So we didn’t want to just do a routine de-escalation training, a “check off the box” session. We wanted to have a de-escalation *culture*. And that starts with asking ourselves, what is culture? Culture is a shared set of values and beliefs. Culture shapes identity. We must identify ourselves not as warriors, but as guardians, and ask what is it that we are doing as police officers? Police exist to help people, not kill people. We’re not here to pull the trigger whenever we can, just because we can.

We knew that this was not going to be an easy lift, and we knew that for a cop to really buy into this, it’s going to have to come from someone other than myself, and it can’t be taught by somebody who’s been assigned to training and hasn’t been on the street in 25 years. So I looked within the organization for people who had unassailable reputations. I looked for the people who, when the cops come out of the academy and ask the veteran officers, “Who’s the best cop in the department?”, well the answer would be people like Ralph Thornton, or Kevin Lutz, or Bill Murray. These officers and many others, regardless of rank, are the drum majors, the people who establish the cadence.

So we pulled these people in and gave the training to them to do, and asked, “This is what we are looking to do. Here are the overarching ideas. Make this work for us.” There were sacrifices in this process as the key people were in high-profile, important positions, but without them our success would be limited.



Reinforcing the message at roll calls: These formal and informal leaders started to do the training, and we did more than just scenario-based training. We decided that we were going to talk about this *every day* before we walk out of the roll call to hit the streets. We get several thousand calls a year for “man with a gun.” Our officers are constantly going into those situations, people with a mental illness, people with knives. If we’re going to make this work, we have to ingrain it into what we do every day, because this isn’t just a training, it’s a culture.

Preservation of Life Award: I think it’s important to remember that cops are going to do what you ask them to do, for the most part. And we all want to be patted on the back. So we established a Preservation of Life Award. Most organizations give awards for bravery and courage to the officers who fire a gun to stop a bank robber. But the behavior that we’re trying to encourage here—showing restraint in dealing with a mentally ill person with a rock or a knife—falls by the wayside. And that’s where you get to the locker-room mentality of “You should have shot that guy!”

But when the organization starts to recognize and reward the type of behavior that you want, that helps serve as a catalyst, and it reaches everyone in the organization, because they see a colleague being formally recognized in front of their peers at an awards ceremony, and they didn’t need to fire their weapon to be honored.

**CAMDEN COUNTY, NJ
SGT. RALPH THORNTON**

Wexler: Ralph, how long have you been a Camden officer?

Sergeant Thornton: 20 years.

Wexler: So you know your community, and you know what policing is like in Camden. What was your reaction when Chief Thomson called you in and told you he was picking you as one of the leaders to implement this new training on use of force?

Sergeant Thornton: Well, first you have to realize that this goes back farther, to when the chief said to me, “Thor, we can clean up the city by just having walking beats and putting boots on the ground.” And I thought, “We can’t do this. We’ve been chasing drug dealers and guys with guns; we’ve been chasing after the crime.”

But we started in my part of the city, where I grew up, Parkside. We put boots on the ground, and we ran drug dealers out of Parkside, not by locking them up, but just by being there.

So when the chief came to me with this new training, I was ecstatic. This was my chance to change the face of how



my residents see police officers. I didn't have a problem with this, because I looked at the YouTube videos of police use of force nationwide, and I could see things were going wrong.

Wexler: I remember once we were talking, and you talked about the sanctity of human life. Tell us about that.

Sergeant Thornton: When we utilize the CDM [Critical Decision-Making Model], we start from the core, and that's the sanctity of human life, and then we build on that. Without the sanctity of life as the core, the CDM doesn't work, because you can run the whole loop but you'll keep making the same mistakes. You'll rush in and not take the time to assess the situation.

But if you stop and think, "Why am I here? I'm here to save a person's life," then everything else falls into line.

CAMDEN COUNTY LIEUTENANT KEVIN LUTZ

Wexler: Kevin, the people you chose weren't experienced trainers, so how did they prepare for this?

Lieutenant Lutz: We had several training sessions just with that group. I sat down with them individually and made sure we had complete agreement on what we would be putting out to the officers.

And the most important thing, after the officers received that training, was to reinforce it and make sure we sustained it over time. Because even with this two-day block of instruction, it has to be reinforced, or it will be perishable, just like any other skill.



VOLUSIA COUNTY, FL SHERIFF MIKE CHITWOOD: Americans Are Demanding that Their Police Leaders Improve the Response to Persons with Mental Illness

(At the time of the ICAT training on December 13-14, Mike Chitwood was chief of police in Daytona Beach. On January 3, he was sworn in as Sheriff of Volusia County, FL.)

Wexler: Mike, years ago when you were trained in the Philadelphia Police Department, if you saw a man with a knife, what did you do?

Sheriff Chitwood: You ran up with your gun drawn and shouted, "Drop the knife, drop the knife, drop the knife." And if he took a step toward you, he got shot and killed.



Wexler: So how do you overcome the fear of what will happen with someone with a knife? What was your strategy for implementing this in Daytona Beach?

Sheriff Chitwood: First of all, the scenario-based training shows you how to get comfortable with dealing with that person. It's teaching the right tactics to protect yourself.

And the second point is, what are your sergeants and lieutenants doing? The statistics bear out that if your sergeants and lieutenants get to that scene quickly, the odds of a deadly encounter drop dramatically. The higher the rank that gets there, the quicker you're going to knock it down. An officer may be a skeptic about de-escalation, but it's different if the sergeant is there or is on the radio, giving commands and saying, "What's the last time we were at this location? Has this person been Baker Acted² before? Are there any weapons? Here's what we're going to do." As you're gathering all that information and the sergeant is taking charge, there is no reason to charge into that house.

Our communities expect more from us: If you have a call about a naked guy with a machete inside his house, and 22 seconds after the police arrive, he's dead, that's not what we're paid to do. His mother called us to the home to help him. Someone should have said, "Hold the perimeter, and let's get the trained people in there. He's inside, he's not going anywhere. We have time to see where we need to go." This needs to become a department-wide philosophy.


In Daytona Beach, our population is about 55 percent white, 45 percent African-American. Volusia County is much bigger, it's 75 percent white, it's predominantly Republican, and it has a lot of gun owners. But when I circled the county, it didn't matter whether I was in the city or was out in the county addressing a group of Constitutionalists, the same question was asked: "What are you going to do about officers shooting unarmed, mentally ill people? What is your plan, chief, if you're running for Sheriff?"

We have a huge cry in America, in my opinion, of people telling police leaders, "You need to do something about this."

DAYTONA BEACH CAPTAIN JAKARI YOUNG

Wexler: Captain Young, what did you think when Mike Chitwood announced that Daytona Beach would do this retraining on use of force?

Captain Young: I myself, and I think the majority of our agency, were geared up and ready for it. When you pay attention and



2. The Florida Mental Health Act of 1971, known as the Baker Act, provides for the examination or institutionalization of persons with a mental illness who pose a risk of harm to themselves or others.

look at what's been occurring with all the incidents of unrest as a result of shootings of mentally ill persons and unarmed persons, the majority of us were on the same page. We knew that something has to happen, something needs to change.

So when Chief Chitwood brought this to us, most of us were already thinking along those lines, and thinking, "We will see what this is, and we will embrace it." Even if we don't do it exactly the way it's laid out, we can integrate it with what we are already doing. So there was no resistance from me; I was excited about it and looking forward to it.

BURLINGTON, VT CHIEF BRANDON DEL POZO:

We Brought Some Specialized Tactics From NYPD Emergency Service Unit to Burlington

Wexler: Brandon, you came to be chief in Burlington, VT after an amazing career in the NYPD. How did your experience in New York influence your approach to training in Burlington?



Chief Del Pozo: In New York I learned that you can have a lot of people responding to an incident, but if the officers are all acting individually, you aren't getting the maximum value to do good police work. The Emergency Service Unit in New York was always very selective, because they knew that they have to work as a team. So they assemble the best men and women to do teamwork. And when I went to Burlington, I noticed that there was sort of a vacuum when it came to teamwork.



Chiefs Brandon del Pozo, Scott Thomson, and Michael Chitwood, and PERF Executive Director Chuck Wexler

Three weeks after I was sworn in as chief, one of my officers shot somebody in another town. I got a phone call at 1 in the morning, and was told, "We shot a guy in the next town over." It was a mutual aid situation. The guy was barricaded inside a trailer, and he just came out of the trailer with what turned out to be an air rifle, started walking toward the cops, and they open fired on him.

And it was considered a justified shooting, but I asked, "Why wasn't that door tied shut?" We started with these little tactics that can actually make a big difference. This is one of the first things they are taught to do in the ESU in New York. If you can tie a door off, then you are in control of when that door opens. You don't have to worry about the person bursting out of the door at any moment, and then you have to react suddenly. You can really slow it down with a piece of rope. The rope ensures that the door opens when *we* decide it opens.

Six months later, we had another incident with an emotionally ill man who was threatening to kill everyone in his apartment building. Officers responded, and the man retreated and barricaded himself. He was armed with two huge knives, one the length of his forearm. So I got there, and I was pleased that the officers had tied the door off. They were in control of the pacing now.

I said, "Let's drill a hole through the wall into that apartment so we can use a camera to see what's happening." The Police Department didn't have any power tools, so I went home and got a drill, and we drilled a hole and put a camera in. After waiting about four hours, we cleared the apartment very methodically, and we went in. He was holed up in his bathroom, a very small bathroom. We sprayed the bathroom with chemical irritant, but it didn't bother him at all. So we made a plan to go in with some new-model Tasers we had acquired. We used polycarbonate shields to get close in. But the Tasers completely failed, and the guy came out of the bathroom screaming and waving the knives. Everyone retreated except two guys who were trapped, and one of those officers killed the subject.

Again, it was a justified shooting, but it got us thinking. Burlington is a liberal town, and our cops understand that they can't lead with their gun, they have to lead with their mouth. And we have our Street Outreach Team, which is very good at communicating. But we were missing the very simple techniques that the ESU in New York uses to control a situation.

Small changes in tactics can produce big results: We asked ourselves, what are the types of equipment that the elite units use, that can filter down to the patrol officer? Patrol officers are not going to do dynamic entries, they're not going to do urban rescues, they're not going to become

divers, they won't do hazmat response, they're not going to do elaborate terrorism stuff. But can they learn to tie some knots around a door? Yes. Can they use a shield? Yes. We also have two small robots that we use. So now when there's a burglary, instead of an officer going in to see if the burglar is hiding in the house, we clear the rooms, floor by floor, with a robot. It has an infrared camera, so it can see into rooms at night.

We're also developing a Y-bar that provides seven feet of space between the officer and a person in a confined space, like a hallway or a bathroom or a corner. So if you have a team with shields, leading with that Y-bar, you know that at least that person can't bum-rush the officers very easily. And this part is real down-home Vermont—we had the shop class at the high school build us different versions of the Y-bar.

These may sound like simple things, but as a precinct commander in the NYPD, I was always very impressed with how the ESU used these types of devices. Even a fire extinguisher can be used as a water cannon. If you pump it up to 110 pounds per square inch, it's great for repelling dogs if you're doing a search warrant, or if you're facing someone with a blunt instrument or a knife, and you need to advance on them in a confined space. If you get blasted in the face with a water cannon, while someone else is confining you with the Y-bar, and the officers have shields, it can be effective. It doesn't always work, but we never use these tactics without having a lethal option ready as well.

Officer safety is the goal: It's important to emphasize that this is about officer safety. The robots that we acquired cost thousands of dollars, but if somebody destroys a robot, that's a confrontation he had with a robot instead of a cop. If that Y-bar gives us seven feet of space between somebody with a blunt instrument and us, that's seven feet of space that protects the officer. And \$5 worth of rope can allow us to decide when a door opens, rather than someone just appearing at the door and suddenly we have to react.

SEATTLE SGT. ERIC PISCONSKI:

This Is Really About Keeping Cops Safe, And Getting Everybody Home Safe

Wexler: Eric, have you faced some challenges in Seattle in changing your training on use of force?

Sergeant Piskonki: Yes, we certainly did. We started about three and a half years ago to integrate new training with many of the de-escalation principles and their intersection with use of force. Initially, we saw a lot of folded arms and skeptical looks. The officers wanted to know, "Is this the touchy-feely stuff? Is this the social worker stuff?" We



also heard comments such as, "This is going to get me hurt" and "This isn't part of our job."


But it really is about keeping cops safe, getting everybody home safe, and trying to mitigate those situations so we can use the least amount of necessary force. We did what many others have mentioned to get that message out and get our trainers prepared and up to speed. Fortunately, we are a large enough agency that we have an entire in-house training unit in addition to the state Academy. So, we coordinated with some of our key trainers as well as officers out on the street who had demonstrated credibility; that makes all the difference in the world. You need to involve the people who are well-respected within the organization from a tactical standpoint, and from a standpoint of being known for doing good work. That way, fellow cops can look at them and say, "OK, I know this guy out on the street, I know this gal out on the street. I know they're good cops, and I'm going to listen to what they have to say."

The topic of how de-escalation and crisis intervention intersect with the use of force can be very inflammatory for many officers. In many ways, it is a true culture shift for law enforcement. Having buy-in from command staff, clear policies addressing it, and informed instructors with credibility makes all the difference.

DALLAS DEPUTY CHIEF JEFF COTNER:

Pushback Against Reforms Dissipates When Everyone Is Involved in It

Wexler: Jeff, your department has been working with us on these issues for several years, and we really learned a lot from your chief, David Brown, who just retired in October. And I know your department has been recognized for doing a lot of work in this area. As everyone knows, four of your officers were murdered last year. How has that impacted what you are doing?



Chief Cotner: That loss is with us today; it has permeated the organization, and will always be part of who we are. The immediate reaction was in the direction of "we have to protect ourselves," where everyone wants to wear full body armor and helmets, but that only lasted a few days. And we saw a need to do some training on ambushes, and we are doing that.

But we are still doing the same things we have been doing for four years, and much like the Seattle story, you get some initial pushback, but once you allow everyone to be a part of it, it dissipates. You can learn a lot from the field officers. They'll give you a lot of ideas about tactics that you can incorporate into your program. And that way, it's sustainable.



DALLAS AREA RAPID TRANSIT SERGEANT STEPHEN JONES: As we do this training, what do we do to build the confidence in officers to handle the situation if it does turn on them?

Chief Chitwood: One of your options is always lethal force. At the end of the day, if nothing else works and everything goes sideways and you have to go to deadly force, you go to deadly force. And that's part of the training.

Chief Thomson: Some of the feedback that we have gotten from officers is that they have a higher level of comfort, *knowing that they do not have to rush into precarious situations.* And that's what we're underscoring when we're teaching them this. The fear levels are dropping. The anxiety levels are dropping, because they know they're not going to be called a coward if they don't rush right into a dangerous situation; they're not going to be second-guessed.

We want you to have as much time as possible. Do not thrust yourself into a situation where the only option you have left is deadly force. It's almost like a sigh of relief that we have gotten back from many of our older officers. They say, "I wish you had shown us this 15 or 20 years ago!"

This is working. It's starting to get momentum, and it's contagious now. It's starting to become the way that we do things.

**LT. SEAN PATTERSON, NYPD EMERGENCY SERVICE UNIT:
This Is About Giving Our Officers Options**

In April 2016, the New York City Police Department hosted a five-day meeting at the New York City Police Academy of the PERF Working Group that developed ICAT. The Working Group included 60 officials from all ranks at more than 30 local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Lieutenant Patterson and NYPD's Emergency Service Unit were integral to that session and to other ICAT development activities. Participants



ABOVE, LEFT: NYPD officers demonstrated an ineffective, unsafe approach of immediately moving toward a mentally ill person armed with a knife.

ABOVE, RIGHT: NYPD officers then ran the same scenario again, but maintained a safe distance and worked to engage the subject, even as he behaved erratically.

RIGHT: NYPD Detective Jose Otero, who took the role of a subject with mental illness.



reviewed an early draft of ICAT and witnessed scenario-based training exercises conducted by Lieutenant Patterson and other NYPD personnel.

Patterson and his team—Detectives Jose Otero, Steve Stefanokos, and Robert Zajac—conducted ICAT scenarios at the PERF meeting in New Orleans.

It's exciting to be here, having been involved in this project since that week at our Academy last April, when the Working Group put this together and we ran scenarios. And now it's a product going out to the rest of the country.

To give you an idea about our unit, the ESU is less than 1 percent of the NYPD; we're about 400 members. Our training program is about eight months long. We're trained in everything from SWAT and tactics to crisis negotiation. We're all divers, we're all EMTs. We've been around since 1930.

The tactics we use are backed up by numbers. Last year, we had 125,000 calls to the NYPD for emotionally disturbed persons. Out of that 125,000, about 1,800 times the patrol force got there and deemed that they needed extra help, so they called us. Out of those 1,800 times, about 104 times, the individual was armed, with a bat, with a knife. 60 times, we had to physically subdue the individual, and 44 times, we negotiated a voluntary surrender.

In all of those incidents, none of the individuals were

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
A Key Element of ICAT: The Critical Decision-Making Model

One of the six modules in ICAT focuses on the Critical Decision-Making Model (CDM), which is a tool for helping officers to make well-informed, organized decisions about how they will act in any situation, including situations that may involve potential uses of force.

The CDM is a circular five-step process, in which officers collect information; assess a situation; consider their powers and authority; identify options and choose a course of action; and then take action, review, and re-assess the situation.

If an officer's action does not have the desired result, or if conditions change at any time, the officer can restart the process or move to any of the five steps, as appropriate. This process is commonly called "spinning the model."

Police officials who have experience using the CDM report that while it may sound complicated at first, it becomes second-nature as they use it many times a day to develop options and choose a course of action. They learn to constantly ask themselves the pertinent questions about any situation they are facing. Some compare the process to driving a car; actions that require thought when one is first learning to drive, such as activating a turn signal or monitoring lane placement, quickly become routine.



SUPERINTENDENT KIRK KINSELL, POLICE SCOTLAND:

Our National Decision Model Results in Better, More Consistent Outcomes

The ICAT Critical Decision-Making Model is based largely on the United Kingdom's National Decision Model, which was created approximately five years ago to guide police officers as they respond to complex situations. Superintendent Kirk Kinnell explained how such decision models give officers greater confidence in evaluating situations, deciding on a course of action, and explaining their decisions later, if necessary, during court proceedings or reviews of police actions.



The National Decision Model for Police Scotland and the UK is a method for explaining and justifying decisions that have been taken. You can see on the screen that there are five elements, and all of them are relatively detailed. We

have found over the years as we train cops to use the Decision Model every day and they become relentless in using it, that it gives them more time to assess what's happening and think through all their options. And it results in better assessments.

Our officers are now two or three years down the line with this, and their judgments, based on the information they gather and on their threat assessments, are pretty consistent and standardized across the whole country, which was our objective. And when it comes to any legal challenges, we are stronger as an organization, and we are able to protect the officers and protect the reputation of the organization.


DAYTONA BEACH, FL LT. TODD MCBRIDE:

Decision Models Are Similar

To What SWAT Teams Have Been Doing for Years

Tom Wilson, PERF Director of Applied Research: Todd, you've been a SWAT guy for a long time. Is the Critical Decision-Making Model any different from what you've been doing on a regular basis?

Lieutenant McBride: SWAT teams have been doing this for years. As part of taking action, we always collect information, analyze it, and then we assess all the risks, plan for all the risks, develop contingencies, and assign personnel to effectively bring that situation to a peaceful resolution. If something occurs that changes the situation, for example, if another threat appears, we spin the model again and reassess the situation.



Afterwards, we always conduct a debrief and an after-action report, to determine whether there was anything that we could have done better.

LT. SEAN PATTERSON, NYPD EMERGENCY SERVICE UNIT:

Using a Decision Model and Slowing a Situation Down Will Give Officers Better Options

I agree with Todd 100 percent. We do this all the time; we just didn't have a name for it.

The Emergency Service Unit is not a call-out team; we're on patrol 24-7. So whether we're called to a barricade situation, where we have a little more time to spin the model, or whether it's two officers confronted with a situation right in front of them at Times Square, they're going to do the same thing and ask themselves, Do I have enough resources? What is my legal right to be here? If the subject does this, what am I going to do? Do I need more people here? Do I have the right equipment?

You're just constantly running these questions through your head, and at any point in time, if the situation changes, you can always spin the model and start over. But if you slow it down and you think through it, you're going to have better options.

Tom Wilson: You guys are the tactical elite. Will patrol cops have a problem with this?

Lieutenant Patterson: No.

Crisis Recognition and Response

An important module in ICAT training focuses on teaching officers how to recognize a situation that involves a person in crisis, and how to respond to such a situation in ways that are most likely to result in a peaceful, safe resolution for everyone involved.

In this context, “crisis” is defined as “an episode of mental and/or emotional upheaval or distress that creates instability or danger, and causes behavior that is considered disruptive by the community, by friends or family members of the person, and/or by the person himself.”

The definition is intentionally broad, to include incidents stemming from mental illness (including perception disorders such as hallucinations, thought disorders such as delusions, and mood disorders such as wild extremes in mood), substance abuse, medical conditions, or situational stress, such as job loss or troubled personal relationships.

Participants at the New Orleans training conference discussed various aspects of crisis recognition and response.

HOUSTON LT. SPENCER COKER:

In Our Training, Mental Health Professionals Play the Roles of Persons with Mental Illness

PERF Director of Program Management Kevin Morison:

Lieutenant Coker, Houston was one of our pilot sites that tested ICAT, and I know you worked to have realistic scenarios about dealing with mentally ill people. How did you do that?

Lieutenant Coker: We have units in the Houston Police Department that are called CIRT units (Crisis Intervention Response Team),³ where we partner an officer with a mental health professional. These officers are full-time and are not in the calls-for-service loop, so they can respond to CIT calls that are more serious than what the patrol officers can address.



When we did our pilot-testing of ICAT, we called in those mental health professionals to be the role players for the mental illness scenarios. We believe that in order to train officers and get the most appropriate response to the training, we wanted our role players to be absolutely involved and passionate about what they’re doing. So we had these people who were dedicated to the mental health profession.

It was a big success, because it helped the officers to sort of lose themselves in the scenarios, because they were more realistic.

GREENVILLE, SC CHIEF KENNETH MILLER:

A Person with a History of Mental Illness Can Strengthen Your Training of Officers

In Greenville, we have a phenomenal relationship with our local chapter of NAMI (National Alliance on Mental Illness).

3. See Houston Police Department web page, “Mental Health Division, Crisis Intervention Response Team.” <http://www.houstoncirt.org/mental-health-division-2/>

They have worked tirelessly to help officers understand the principles of CIT training and dealing successfully with mentally ill persons.

But our relationship with NAMI is insufficient for helping us deal with all the issues, which is why we’re all here—to learn what more we can do.


I can tell you that in working through the issues and working to train our officers to build the skill sets we need to reduce conflict, and particularly to reduce instances of deadly force and other serious force, having folks like Paton Blough in the room to understand his perspective and how he sees things, it helps us learn. It helps us understand how to position ourselves in that engagement for the safety of everybody. It’s a huge piece to our training locally to have Paton as a part of it, and to have him tell his story there.



Paton Blough Helps Police To Understand Mental Illness

Training programs for officers regarding mental illness can be more compelling if they include a person who has experienced mental illness and can explain to officers how mental illness diminishes their ability to respond rationally to a police officer.

Paton Blough is such an advocate. Mr. Blough, who participated in PERF’s conference in New Orleans, has a bipolar disorder and has been arrested by the police on six occasions while in a delusional state because of his illness. He has participated in crisis intervention training in many police departments, and serves on the board of the National Alliance on Mental Illness, South Carolina. At PERF’s conference in New Orleans, he offered guidance on how officers can be more effective in establishing communications and building trust with a person with a mental illness. For additional information, go to www.rehinge.com.



Paton Blough

SEATTLE SERGEANT ERIC PISCONSKI:

Cops Are Not Clinicians, But They Can Learn To Recognize the Words and Actions That Signify a Crisis

Kevin Morison: Eric, PERF borrowed Seattle’s definition of behavioral crisis for the ICAT program. Tell us, what does that definition mean, and why is it important for officers to have a definition of what a behavioral crisis is?

Sergeant Piskonki: When we rolled this out, we asked our officers to look at that definition and tell us, what percentage of the folks they deal with meet that definition? And they’d say “most of them.”

Behavioral Crisis: A Definition


- **An episode of mental and/or emotional distress that is creating instability or danger and is considered disruptive by the community, friends, family or the person him/herself**

Adapted from the Seattle Police Department



The definition is very broad on purpose; and it's important for all officers to understand exactly what can be a crisis. Officers need to be aware that a "crisis" can affect anyone; whether you're talking about psychosis, chemical dependency, behavioral crisis, or a medical condition. Our message to officers was, "This can happen anywhere, anytime, to anyone you are dealing with."

A behavioral crisis can be caused by different kinds of inputs, whether it's a mental illness, emotional stressors, a medical condition, or a traumatic brain injury—which is sometimes associated with assault victims and vehicle collisions. These are the type of things to look out for when you're interacting with individuals. Substance abuse also generates a lot of 911 calls. Many folks who suffer from mental health issues, or dealing with some personal crisis, are self-medicating. They don't like the side effects of their meds, so they use street drugs or alcohol to supplement. There's also situational stress that can cause a person to go into crisis—money, family, work, etc. That's the one that can affect anyone, including cops, just the stresses of day-to-day life and how that builds up.



Adapted from Nassau County, NY Police Department 10

Morison: So you're a patrol officer, you respond to a call of someone acting erratically. You're not going to diagnose the person on the street, so why is it important to understand these different causes?

Sergeant Piscofski: You're right, we're not clinicians; we're cops. But it's about recognizing the *Words, Actions,* and *Behaviors* associated with that crisis. When there are a

lot of different inputs possibly causing the crisis, that reinforces the model of slowing it down; to gain time and determine what is causing a particular crisis. This includes using distance and shielding to gain time; trying to assess the situation; asking a lot of questions; using the CDM model. Ideally, we want to figure out what the input is and where it might be coming from; then we can determine what resources we need to address the issue.

It is important for officers to try and take a holistic approach when dealing with individuals in crisis—especially if they are high utilizers of 911 services. We try to get officers to ask the question, "Is it more important to handle this call quickly, knowing I might be out here again shortly, **or** could I take some extra time to find a better resolution addressing the underlying issue creating the 911 interaction?"

Morison: Eric, how do officers use this information?

Sergeant Piscofski: We tell officers that whatever situation a person is going through, it's very real for them. It's occurring for them, just as us being in this room is occurring for us. Asking questions about what's going on, about their history, resources, medications, etc., and being very direct with those questions—more likely than not, they are willing to tell their story. It is often how you frame the questions as well, such as, "Has anyone ever told you to take medication? Is there anyone you talk to regularly? What have the doctors told you on previous visits?" There still remains a large stigma around mental health and chemical dependency issues; and demonstrating compassion and empathy goes a long way toward building rapport. Most people are willing to talk about it; they're looking for an advocate to help them get through that episode.

Paton Blough: And we all have problems, including officers. Who hasn't ever had a problem with their wife? So as you talk about these things, you learn that the person is having trouble with his wife, and you develop empathy.

Sergeant Piscofski: By the nature of our job, we're often viewed in an adversarial way. We show up, we're in uniform, we're there because we got a 911 call, etc. But we have to be able to break through that adversarial role and get into the advocate role; and try to work through this together. We both want a peaceful resolution. No officer wants to use force unless it's absolutely necessary.

The question then becomes, "What can we do to get from Point A to Point B?" At the core of our job, cops are there to solve problems and be decision-makers when people are either unable or unwilling to do it on their own. But when dealing with persons in crisis, that's where it's really about letting down some of those authoritarian barriers in terms of being a cop, and just being a person and having those conversations. Ask the questions and become an advocate.

Asking questions also helps us as law enforcement to problem-solve. You ask, "Hey, you said this happened before. What happened last time? Who did you talk to back then? Can we call that person now? Did that work out well for you last time?"

And suddenly, now I have some solutions in my pocket of what I can do to help get this person through this situation.

NYPD DETECTIVE JEFF THOMPSON:

Emotional vs. Rational Thinking Is a Key Concept in Crisis Response

The concept of emotional vs. rational thinking is at the heart of every basic course on hostage negotiation. When we do training on this, I always say that this is the most important slide, because it explains everything that's going on in a crisis situation. In crisis situations, what's dictating the person's actions? It's their emotions. And when emotions are dictating a person's actions—whether it's frustration, anger, fear, or sadness—it's more difficult to influence them.



Crisis Recognition And Response INSERT AGENCY LOGO

■ **Emotional–Rational Thinking Scale**

Active Listening

Emotions

Rational Thinking

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Courtesy of Detective Jeff Thompson, NYPD 22

Our job as police officers is to resolve the immediate crisis at hand. On the CIT side, they are about getting people long-term care and help, but our job is more immediate. And if we are aiming to get voluntary compliance, it's very nearly impossible to get voluntary compliance from somebody who is acting out of emotions. So we use active listening skills and other techniques to bring down the emotions and bring up more rational thinking. The research shows that people are more easily influenced when they are thinking rationally.

And sometimes people say, "Oh, people with a mental illness cannot think rationally," but that's not true. We know that from our own experiences. And people are more easily influenced by someone they have a connection with. That's why it's important to show empathy and create a rapport. To establish rapport, one of the easiest things we teach our guys is to give their name first, before

Crisis Recognition And Response INSERT AGENCY LOGO

■ **Behavioral Change Staircase**

Introduction

Empathy

Rapport

Influence

Behavioral Change

Active Listening

Using Time to Make/Build Connection

POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM

Adapted from FBI Behavioral Change Stairway Model 28

asking the person for his name. "Hello, my name is Jeff Thompson."

The people who don't know anything about the work we do say this is soft, touchy-feely stuff. Absolutely not. There is strategy on each and every one of these steps—show empathy, establish rapport, exert influence, all toward the goal of behavioral change. We're trying to get voluntary compliance. We're going to get compliance in the end, but if we can get voluntary compliance, it's safer for everyone, including us.

Paton Blough: It's also important to remember that your body language has to match what you're saying. If you tell me, "I'm your friend," but you pull back when I want to shake your hand, I will pick up on that in a second. Those inconsistencies are huge. Now maybe you don't want to shake my hand because it makes you vulnerable—I could grab your hand and pull you. So maybe a fist-bump is better. But try to make your body language match your voice.

Morison: Why is it important not to lie to a person in crisis?

Paton Blough: Truthfulness is extremely important. A lot of people with mental illness are "religious." It's not uncommon for people with bipolar disorder to think they're God. So if an officer shows any untruthfulness, they will immediately think you're the devil, because the Bible says the devil is the father of liars. So if you lie, I think you're the devil, and it's game on.

Detective Thompson: And if you lie, you have to keep matching what you say with the previous lies, and you get cognitive overload.

Also, in the world we work in, we have a lot of repeat customers. So maybe you trick someone, you say, "Come on with us, you'll be out of the hospital in an hour," but he doesn't get out until the next day. Who are you screwing over? Maybe not yourself; it might be the cop on the 4-to-12 shift.

Paton Blough: And where it says "Don't diminish the person," that's important. Part of a manic episode is that I want to be big and important. So I'll say, "I called the Governor today." And you might roll your eyes and say, "Yeah, right." But I probably *did* call the Governor today. That doesn't mean I talked to her, but I *tried* to call her. So don't roll your eyes, because I will notice it, and it will hurt that rapport you're trying to build.

Crisis Recognition And Response INSERT AGENCY LOGO

■ **Some Things Not To Do**

- Don't join in the person's behavior
- Don't confuse the person
- Don't diminish the person
- Don't lie or deceive
- Don't automatically view non-compliance as a threat

POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM

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>> continued from page 6

harm, and none of us were harmed. There were bumps, there were bruises, there were cuts, there were scrapes, but it resulted in not one loss of life on either side.

It's not an absolute. We've had incidents where protocol wasn't followed, or where you couldn't follow protocol, because it happened that quick. But as Chuck said earlier, this is all about giving our cops options.

Regarding what we're going to do here today in running scenarios, we have a total of 54 years of experience in my team right here, now, that you're going to see, in dealing with people in crisis.

Lieutenant Patterson, along with other police personnel, then directed a demonstration of officers responding to a common scenario: an emotionally disturbed person with a knife, wandering around in public. (See photos, p. 6.)

**LOS ANGELES CAPTAIN JOHN MCMAHON:
We May Disengage, But We Don't Just Walk Away**

One of the things we have realized is that labels are very important, and if there are two words that turn cops away, it's "walk away." That goes against the grain of everything we do. So we came up with a procedure that we labeled "strategic disengagement," because in any of the 50 states, it's not a crime to be mentally ill in your house. Our officers are called upon in these situations to solve psychological problems. Often it's a relative who calls the police to make this problem go away. So we need to make clear, what are the initial expectations? What do they want us to do? We say, "There's a chance we may need to make an arrest, or we may need to use force," and nine out of 10 times, they say, "No, don't do any of that stuff, don't hurt him." And so ultimately you've got that standoff.



So in much the same way that we handle domestic violence incidents, we will triage the incident and focus on getting the person placed. If there's no imminent threat, we may do a strategic disengagement, but we don't just walk away and leave it alone. We infuse it with some positive follow-up work, and I'll turn it over to Dr. Luann Pannell, who's our director of police training and education, to talk about how we follow up.

**DR. LUANN PANNELL, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT:
Police Agencies Need a Robust Mental Evaluation Unit**

I'm glad to see an emphasis on teamwork, because we will not arrest our way out of the mental illness problem in our

country. What I think really makes the difference, especially on mental illness calls, is giving our officers resources. It's one thing to give them CIT training or de-escalation training, but we also have to give them resources for alternatives. If we're not going to arrest the person, or if we're going to strategically disengage, we want to make sure we have a robust mental evaluation response team.



In our Department it's actually a specialized section, the Mental Evaluation Unit. They are the ones who follow up, who will recognize if this is a contact that we have had over and over again, what resources were put there before, and they bring in the Department of Mental Health. So we are not just walking away, we are providing an alternative service, and a more appropriate service for resolving this contact. Many of these individuals don't need to be arrested; they need some kind of mental health services.

**FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA MAJOR RICHARD PEREZ:
We Are Saving Lives with New Policies and Training**

There will be pushback, internally and externally, to some of these concepts, but at the end of the day, there is no question that because of the implementation of these philosophies and this training, our officers have in fact saved lives. And that's why we're here.



When we save a life, and you have the chief of police standing out there and saying, "We value the sanctity of all human life," the troops want to hear that. They want to hear that positive feedback that they did everything right and did it with teamwork. They want to hear it from the chief and from the elected officials as well.

**MIAMI BEACH DEPUTY CHIEF RICHARD CLEMENTS:
Officers Are Receptive to De-Escalation Concepts**

From the comments I am hearing from around the room, I can tell you we as a Department are definitely on the right path. A year ago, when our Department started implementing the scenario-based training and started talking about de-escalation and command and control, I could see that there was some hesitation, primarily because



it was a touchy subject. We had had a controversial officer-involved shooting that touched on this very topic. So we went into the training knowing that there might be some pushback.

But during the course of the training, people became more receptive to the concepts of de-escalation, and to “distance plus cover equals time,” and to the command and control module that we were putting into the training as well. It was working and the message was well received. So I can tell you, we are on the right path. And as I listen to other people in the room today, I am getting some more ideas for things to incorporate into our next round of training in January that I believe will strengthen this effort.

I believe that the first time these training concepts are used by our officers in a real life situation, and it’s done in a manner that shows that it works and we can save a life, it’s going to be the catalyst for officers to say, “Hey, this really does work, and we’re not being asked to jeopardize our lives. We all can go home safely.” This should always be our goal.

PALM BEACH COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE MAJOR BILL BRANNIN: Our ‘Tactical Pause’ Has Reduced Shootings

Over a period of time, we had an average of about nine officer-involved shootings a year. So we made some changes in how we did things, and we lowered our officer-involved shootings to three in 2015 and to two so far this year [as of December 14].



We implemented what we call a “tactical pause.” And basically that’s just slowing things down in our response to these calls, giving our people more time to get there, more time to come up with a plan, more time to bring more resources to the scene, and putting more options on the table.

We’re lucky that we have a lot of equipment that we can bring to bear, including less-lethal tools. Every officer is equipped with Tasers; everyone has pepper spray; we have pepper balls; we have Sage guns; we have K-9 units; we have a lot of tools we can use.

But we find that we’re not really relying on these tools. We don’t need to, because we are slowing the incidents down. And instead of one man rushing to a call, it’s three or four with a sergeant. Having a supervisor respond to a lot of these calls is essential. It brings a level of leadership and a level of calmness to the call, and it helps to sort things out in a more deliberate manner.

Chuck Wexler: And has the tactical pause resulted in any officer safety issues?

Major Brannin: None at all. We haven’t had anyone injured. It hasn’t happened.

When this started at the PERF meeting in DC, you said that there were about 900 fatal shootings in 2015, and your focus was on incidents involving mentally ill persons, and on people armed with knives or blunt instruments, but not guns. And that’s where we’ve seen our biggest improvement. Some of our shootings in the past did involve mentally ill people armed with edged weapons or blunt instruments, and that’s where we’ve seen our biggest improvement.

Wexler: Yes, that’s where we think we can make the most difference. There are other situations where we know we won’t have any impact—a bank robber running out the door, aiming his gun at people....

Major Brannin: The bad guy is always going to have a say in the matter, so I don’t think we’ll ever have zero officer-involved shootings. There are people who want to harm law enforcement. But in dealing with people with mental illness—these people are not criminals. They’ve got some issues they need help with, and I think if we can deal with them more effectively, it will be a lot less lethal.

WAYNE COUNTY, MI SHERIFF BENNY NAPOLEON: Handling Persons with Mental Illness Is a Constant Concern in Jails

Wexler: Benny, sheriffs have a different perspective on these things. Do you run jails?



Sheriff Napoleon: I have jails, and I have people on the street. We do both. The jail situation is much different from on the street. On any given day, I have 2,300 or 2,400 people in the jail, and they are not necessarily nice or compliant folks. But with adequate staffing and planning to handle the kinds of confrontations we have with inmates, we have a certain amount of leverage over them, and they understand that we have that leverage. One of the best things that ever happened to us was the Taser. Believe it or not, all inmates have to do is see the Taser, and most of them comply in a hurry.

Wexler: But even in jail, people make knives, they can hurt you, so you have to know how to deal with that...

Sheriff Napoleon: Absolutely, we have seen all of that, and firearms are not an option, because inside the jail, we don’t allow anyone to have weapons past a certain point. There should not be a gun inside the confines of the jail.

But we use less-lethal weapons, and often it goes back to training officers in how to defuse a situation. And we do have a luxury in the jail in that we have a Mental Health Ward. Everyone who comes in is classified, and if we know they have a history of mental illness, we can immediately put them in a place where they are dealt with as a mental health consumer.

Wexler: What percentage of your jail population has mental health issues?

Sheriff Napoleon: About 70 percent.

Wexler: So you routinely have to defuse situations with people who are mentally ill...

Sheriff Napoleon: It's not just a daily thing, it's *constant*. We have a lot of people who have been debilitated because of drugs or alcohol or other issues, and that's the majority of our population.

And in terms of our work on the street, understanding the human side of the people we encounter will always help us in defusing those situations.

I think the biggest "sell" for all of this is going to happen when we have an incident where the deputies do everything right, but it just turns out wrong. And the test will be whether the elected officials stand up and say, "Everyone did what we trained them to do, and unfortunately it didn't turn out the way we anticipated it would, but we're still going to support the deputies because they did everything they were asked to do."

In the eyes of the rank and file, when they see that happen, they will say, "OK, this is legitimate. If we do things the way we are taught to do it and it happens to turn out bad, they're going to stand up for us."

ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE LT. COLONEL JEFF BADER:
**If We Can Control the Clock,
The Advantage Shifts in Our Favor**

With me today I have Sgt. John Conrardy, who's assigned to our Continuing Education Academy, and Sgt. Jeremy Romo, who's our Crisis Intervention Team sergeant; he's also the statewide coordinator for the state of Missouri for CIT.

We've had a robust CIT program for several years, and we feel that some of the things we have been discussing, especially the Critical Decision-Making Model, can be worked into our CIT training, our continuing education training, and our recruit training. The three of us feel that that CDM provides a solid foundation for some of the options that we're trying to teach our officers.



We've always subscribed to the philosophy that if we can control the clock, it opens up a vast amount of resources and equipment to us. And I think that most of the departments in the room would agree with that. If we can gain control of the clock, the advantage shifts in our favor.

DENVER DEPUTY CHIEF DAVID QUINONES:
We Are Revising Our Entire Use-of-Force Training

Five years ago, we got our first outside chief, Chief Robert White, and he's been on board with all of the changes coming down the pike. We have been making changes since Chief White arrived, and we participated in the PERF Working Group in New York that helped develop ICAT. Every officer is being trained through a 40-hour CIT program, we're about 97 percent there, including an eight-hour CIT training for command staff. And we have redone the use-of-force section as it relates to shooting at vehicles.



Chief White often tells legislators that you can't legislate good policing; it comes down to the training. And we found that the training really changed the officers' mindset as it relates to not shooting at vehicles. We gave the officers options as to what to do, as opposed to just telling them what not to do. We are currently redoing the entire use-of-force training, to include the Critical Decision-Making Model.

DR. LUANN PANNELL, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT:
**Debriefs Following a Critical Incident
Should Be More Thorough and Standardized**

Yesterday we were talking about how to develop good debriefers. I would really encourage you to develop standards for getting the most out of your debriefs. We've been using



Capt. John McMahon and Dr. Luann Pannell of the Los Angeles Police Department



Bay Area Rapid Transit Police Training Officer Stewart Lehman running a debrief following a scenario-based training exercise

debriefing sheets, and we're really encouraging people to facilitate their debriefs to get a more robust examination of the incident.

Most often, we like to review the tactical parts of it, but it's also important to review some of these other skills, like communications. It's important to ask questions like, "At what point in that conversation did you lose the person? At what point did it start to escalate?" You need people who are trained to ask those deeper questions.

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD SGT. WILLIAM GLEASON:
We Have Achieved Good Results with PERF Guidelines on Re-Engineering Use of Force

All of this has really worked for us. I went to the first PERF meeting on re-engineering use of force in 2015, and we incorporated that in our in-service training, and the results speak for themselves. Shootings are down; all the shootings are legally justified; and we've done



a lot of research about avoidable force incidents. And we're avoiding use-of-force incidents by implementing this Critical Decision-Making Model, slowing things down, and doing all the things that we've learned.

We've gotten buy-in by making it a personal decision by each professional police officer. We say, "Here's the information, and it is about (a) your safety and (b) your protection."

In other words, (a) you go home at night to your family, and (b) this protects you from criminal or civil litigation. So that's how we got buy-in; it's a personal decision, and they accepted it that way, and as I say, the proof is in the results.

ST. LOUIS CITY POLICE CAPT. ANGELA COONCE:
At Our First ICAT Training, We Will Focus on Quality of Our Response to Calls, Not Merely Speed

We've made great strides since all of the protests in Ferguson and St. Louis. I think that this training and our work with the PERF Working Group have made us rethink a lot of the things we are doing. We're all doing many of these things already; I think what PERF has done is produce a universal training guide so we're all speaking the same language. We can refer to the Critical Decision-Making Model and we all know what that means. The UK officers have been phenomenal to work with, and have helped us to step back and take a breath, to create that time and slow incidents down.



We're having our first ICAT recruit training in January. And one of the issues we're addressing is focusing on the quality rather than the quantity of calls. Working with the ESU in New York taught us to "take as long as it takes." That's their motto and that's their mindset going into scenes. I don't think we've always done that in St. Louis. We're 120 officers short right now in a 1,300-man department, which is pretty significant. So getting the command staff to focus on the quality of each call, and not just on getting the response time and the call times down, I think has been a real focus. And if we save one life by doing that, this is all worth it.

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY POLICE CHIEF MICHAEL THOMPSON:
This Is About Teaching Our Officers that They Have Many Options for Responding to Calls

Wexler: Are the issues on college campuses different for you?



Chief Thompson: It's not really different at all. Arizona State University is a huge university. We have five campuses that we are responsible for protecting across the Phoenix metro area. Our partners from the Tempe and Phoenix police departments are here today.



On occasion we have students who go into crisis, and we have a lot of resources for students that we can bring to bear, such as counseling. We have people who can come out and respond to the scene and help us to de-escalate. But we also have many people on our campuses who have no affiliation with the university, and we are responsible for dealing with them as well.

So I brought my training sergeant with me today, and our main takeaway is about teaching our officers to understand that they have a lot of options. So as a situation develops and unfolds, they should slow things down and constantly be evaluating the scenario. Just because you have decided on a plan doesn't mean you have to stick with that plan if the situation changes. You can always call an audible at the line if you need to. And we're also realizing that we should work with our partner agencies like Tempe and Phoenix to make sure it all goes smoothly.

METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE DEPUTY CHIEF BRIAN JOHNSON:

Chief Anderson Himself Is Telling Officers To Take Their Time and Handle Calls Right

Wexler: Brian, you were one of the 25 chiefs who went with us to Scotland back in 2015, when we first started hearing about some of these concepts, like the critical decision model. Does it seem like a straight line to you, from where we started back then, to where we are now and how it impacts Nashville?

Deputy Chief Johnson:

It does seem like a straight line. One of the things we did, almost as a direct result of the trip to Scotland, was start talking about slowing things down and getting supervisors to the scene more quickly. One of the big-budget items that we are requesting this year is money for more supervisors, so we can get them to the scene more quickly. We encourage the officers to stop, and stage, and wait for backup, and go to the call two at a time.




And to make this more effective, Chief Steve Anderson has personally gone to the roll calls and given the officers that message. That way, they hear it from him, and they don't get a mixed message from somebody else in middle management who's wanting them to get to the calls quicker and clear the calls quicker because the calls are stacking up.

They get to hear from the chief of police himself that "I'm not worried about response time, I want you to slow down, take your time, handle the call right," and let him worry about the politics of response times.

LOS ANGELES CAPTAIN JOHN MCMAHON:

We Need New Training on Use of Force

I think we continue to hear a sort of knee-jerk response from a lot of people who say, "We already do this; we've always done this." But the reality is that if we were doing it, we wouldn't be seeing these videos over and over again that are void of de-escalation techniques. We wouldn't so often be contributing sometimes to validating optics to our critics involved in the national discussion about use of force.

We're at a point now where we do need to have dedicated, single-purpose training on this particular topic, and I think this is going to provide the forum for agencies around the country to roll it out and to label it for what it is. 



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